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The researcher examining the contemporary foreign
policy of a state and tie military operations supporting it
Is often greatly handicapped since he usually does not have
access to classified documents which are related to the sub-
ject matter. Inasmuch as the time period encompassed by
this study lies in the immediate past, a past which iorms
the basis of the uneasy present, it is only natural that
access to such documents is limited.
This study reflects this limited availability of
pertinent information in addition to the usual shortcomings
of a sailor's venture into scholarship. In the opinion
the reader one of these shortcomings may be the author's
went bias. W+t this no apology is made; a thesis is by
definition "a proposition tc be maintained cr defended in
argument.' 1 e possible existence of an antithesis is
cheerfully admitted.
The reader is expected to have some knowledge of the
development oi American ioreign policy in Southeast Asia
since 1945. The material presented in Chapter 11 is Included
merely to provide a short resume of that policy. Ho attempt
has been made to write history on the pages that loll ,
abater's Mew ucrld Dictionary (Cleveland: rid
I ublisl ing Co., mi).
ill

primary endeavor has been to evaluate the performance of an
Instrument of foreign policy by employing the fruits oi
studies in history (in Chapter II) and a conceptual model
(in Chapter 111), The evaluation resulting (in Chapter
is not detlnitive since our perspective in time is tar t
short. The final evaluation will have to await the day when
American power is no longer required to preserve the inde-
pendence oi the nations oi Southeast \sia from communist
encrcaclmtent.
lie assistance oi rofessor \ntl ony . 1 in
directing this writer's research is gratefully acknowledged*
Dr. Sokol , s Keen interest in sea power and penetrating anal-
yses 01 the security problems lacing the United States have
lurnisi ed the point of departure for t! is study. mdid
comments oi . rciessor Claude A. Buss, who reviewed the rirst
dra this study, have been very helpful and many of I is
suggestions have been incorporated in the iinal drait. Iris
writer takes lull responsibility for all opinions expressed
in this study. itions presented should not be
construed as representing those of the Navy or the Depart-
ment of Deiense. All illustration** have been tn rom t
pages of the United States Naval Institute ; roceedin^s (copy-
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Capable as it is, naval power does not exist lor
itself; it exists lor tie country* It exists tc carry
out the international objectives oi the United States,
to guarantee our freedoms: ..reedoa of the seas, man's
freedom, our allies' freedom.*
The United States Navy has a long and proud tradi-
tion oi. service in the Far Last and western Pacific, both in
peace and in war. War-time victories at Manila Bay, Leyte
Gulf, Okinawa and Incton take their places alongside sue
political triumphs as terry's opening oi Japan in 1854, tie
voyage of the Great White Fleet through Asian waters in
1908, and the trustrat ion oi Chinese Communist eiiorts in
IV 58 to force abandonment oi the oilshore Islands*
One may argue that at no time In American history
las sea power been as necessary an instrument oi B»8« *or-
-i policy as it has in the years since World War 11.
Durin s period the United States has been more depend-
ent than ever before on foreign bases, raw materials and
military support, in addition sea power has iurnisl ed the
binding cement of the alliances of the free world whlci have
been a requirement for American survival* The > rei enderance
Address by Admiral Arleigh Bur », Cfcl4
Naval Operations, Deiore the Newspaper Editors Luncheon,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, July 18, 195** •

naval power, a basic component oi aea power, in the Lands
the West was and remains, I greatest statu Lz-
m.. Iniiuence a£ the irar.
e west has applied its naval a* in two critical
areas sit y are anean and thai tar
*.ast. - is study eeaprleta an examination e latter,
oixicaiiy boutheast Asia, in Southeast "\eia, mUko I
Mediterranean , the Us '.1% confronted
wit • .-.._. ... -vsian waters the United states
Navy ^.oims an integral *.art oi the deiense p^^^-K1® 1^®^ oi t
iree world, while in the Mediterranean tie Ka\ role
ox ba a and b& .
•
'-...., l, ,ind , ur
:
;.o»o
ta study utilizes lag components:
(1) the U.S« (2) the at- .... Icy
Dnli i . Ltea, (. . . e pui te is to
examine and evaluate the naval contribution to Cha I we-
raent t aaricai utheai .ia
in the 15 a naval capabilities* The emphaala is
on tie political aspects of se - d navaJ opera
the manner in v/\ iel sl-
it.'.. ~cy objectivea* An endeavor has teen made to
cm a nexus between tore.; . elicy on the on band and
naval operations or I sia since
. . . --uy*

o focus oi this study has been rl«ced on the years
between Lft4f and I960, a period wt ic< saw great changes In
the world political scene, the victorious allies oi the
Second World War had split their alliance asunder, iwo
am were intent on the expansion el t; eir power by any
cable means while the others sought to preserve their
national independence and the heritage oi Western democracy.
In these years new nations emerged as a discredited impe-
rialism withered. Both the i.ree world and tie Soviet colo-
nial empire attempted to capture the symbols tbat would
attract the newly independent into their respective camps.
Durii Ls period the United States took up the unaccus-
tomed burden mj world leadership. With the emergence ot a
bipolar world political system, the United States assumed
many of t? a responsibilities carried by Great Britain in the
2
nineteenth century. This was particularly true in Asia.
Aa in the case o£ their Mlflln fill in forerunners, Americans
were obliged to wield Neptune's trident in the interests
world peace and Ireedom.
e free world was fortunate that at the time the
United States undertook its leadership, the . • Navy was
• strongest in the world. Alt atened by
iara K. hessler, "Air-Sea J ower on the Asian
Perimeter, United States heyal Institute roceec:
(hereaiter abbreviated L^iTX ' U ( October, T, 1025.
i: 5 the United States Navy was three times as
large as the British Navy, the next in bize. w.B. Potter
(***•)» ' United States and *orid aea .over (Engiewood
ClU I :' .rent ice-Hall. i$53), p.'IW.

bur -.soiling Soviet naval stren ti , the sea supremacy -he
Iree world was maintained during tie period encompassed ty
la study.
For purposes c I analysis east Asia is
defined as including the following states, -, r portions
states, and their adjacent waters* East ha .istan, »j
Thailand, Cambodia, La&B t let Nam, Kalaya, . a^ore, Inc -
nesia (including the colonial remnants on eta island
Borneo), the Philippines, and Taiwan,
In dealing with Southeast Asia this study has as its
sett- erhaps, the most vital theater o£ tie cold war.
sse waters have been the scene at the greatest peace-time
ncentrations of U.S. naval power in history. XI is concen-
tration has been the result ox three principal iactcrs. In
• lirst instance the most dangerous overt, threats to world
peace since tie end 01 World War II have occurred in Last
Asia. With the oxce.-tion of the CoEasaunist adventure in
iCorea the principal joints 01 contact, and cc-nilict, between
the Soviet colonial empire and the tree world have been in
Southeast Asia (as that area has been detined in t -ced-
ing paragraph). Today, Quexaoy is the warmest spot el t
cold war.
A second iactor explain!- maintenance 01 lar e
Aaierican naval foreea in Southeast Asian waters is the _-- -
reply of the region. Imposing typographical harriers and
under-developed economies are characteristic utheaet
Asia* lie consequences are poor land conxnunications.

turther, most oi. the populous states ere located on islands
f , entnsulas. these lectors tend to »eke sea transport the
al, otten the only, means oi transport both among the
nations in tie area and with the remainder oi the world*
ase same characteristics tend to nis.v.e sea-air power the
most important military element required to defend the rim-
land 01 i out east Asia and its island littoral.*
tinaily, in the geopolitical context Southeast Asia
comprises a vital position in the defense oi the iree world.
Today all ilip; ing between Europe and the Orient via
the Indian ocean must pass through either the Strait
dacca a the Strait oi Sunda. . . • Control oi these
two Southeast Asia straits gives dominance over a sea
route that is comparable in importance to the Panama
Canal route, furthermore y ail intercontinental airways
in the *ar Last traverse the Southeast Asian area .5
Terminology
Inasmuch as this analysis is concerned with objec-
tives, capabilities and commitments (in ti.at order), it
wculd be well to have the deiinltlons oi these terms fixed
i irmly in mind.
Objectives
A knowledge oi objectives is obviously essential to
any decision maker, fttel knowledge, while c t*at impor-
tance to the military man, is absolutely essential to tl
4Hessler, 1026-27.
l.o., Liepartment ot State Liar Eastern Seriesj,
"Southeast Asia: Critical Area in a Divided J^_~
jLjad, June, IS 55, p. 1.

statesman since he determines, Inter alia , the strategic
military objectives*
Al term objective implies ends rather than
means , it is clear that it can be both simultaneously, since
6
ectives are part ci a hierarchical structure* An inter-
mediate goal in this structure can be the objective ox a
given policy while at the same time existing as means to a
yet higher objective.
• objective at the top oi the hierarchy o£ r,oals
is called the national interest. ii e national interest has
been defined "as the general and continuing end icr which a
7
nation acts. The national Interest is the supreme objec-
tive of tie state; all other objectives are directly or
indirectly means rather than ends. Ibt underlying assuc.
tlon oi International politics is that the primary objective
che state is self-preservation, its major value is "its
a
own continuous, independent existence.
"
Objectives, although a generic term lor all goals,
are normally used to dexine a sreeiiie end, usually at a
lower level than the national interest.
;;active is used to mean a specifically defined -oal or
purpose, lor w. . aat tonal action is planned in terms
Feliks Gross, Forei ;n Policy Analysis (Hew York
I
Philosophical Library, U5**), i. 75
•
7William Keltsel. Mortov lan, Constance Cablenz,
Ited states rorei-ja volley, 1V^5-1V55 (Washiagtoit, D«C«I
e Bro i in^s Institution, 1956), p. h71.
a
Quincy ,»ri ,• t, udy ox International relations
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crolts, 1S55J, '•• i3t.

Maintenance e national interest. lundaraentally
an objective Is an aspect ot the national interest, de-




In the context ci international relations capabil-
ities can be considered synonymous with power. Capability
has been daiined as "the measure oi ti e capacity o£ a state
have other states agree with it on matters in wl ic it Is
interested.'* iower has been called "the ability to influ-
ence the behavior ox. ©titers in accordance with one's own
11
ends." Both power and capability are used to indicate the
ability of a state to achieve its objectives. As used in
tl is study capability refers to the capacity oi one el the
instruments of the state, specifically naval forces.
Inasmuch as capabilities are another way oi express*
power and since power applications can be graduated, it
is possible to arrange capabilities on a "power spectrum."
Is spectrum is a conceptual tool to describe the continuum
cf capabilities. Therefore 9 it is a uaei'ul concept in exam-
ining the properties and characteristics oi an instrument
power, sue1 as the modern navy.
aitzel, Kaplan, Coulenz,
10
Charles Lerche Jr., i-orel n - --" i cy ci t.
People (Euglewood ciiiis: I vvnti ";. ;• i 1: .
11





licies are "speciiic courses oi action designed to
achieve objectives
•
n While objectives are the ends, poli-
cies are the methods. In international relations policy
comprises the courses oi action that a state Implements in
its relations with other states in order to achieve its
13
objectives and icrward the national interests*
Commitments are n the specific undertakings in sup-
3 4port of a specific oiicy. In this study commitments
usually indicate the operations oi American naval power in
SMmpmi t ml American iorei n policy in Southeast Asia*
animation
ere are three threads el thou ht represented in
is study* Each is taken up in a separate chapter* 1
oal chapter is an endeavor to synthesize the subject
matter oi the three preceding chapters*
Chapter II. which is concerned with United States
reign policy in Southeast Asia between 1945 and I960,
treats the subject ire® the standpoint reign policy
c-b.iectiyes . their development and achievement* Chapter III
utilize* the power spectrum to slow the continuum oi naval
capabilities . Chapter IV describes in general terms some




^keitzei, Kaplan, Coblenz, 473.

selected naval eoawltments undertaken by the United States
achieve its foreign policy objectives*
In Chapter V the essential elements of the preceding
chapters are related in such a manner as to provide a yard-
stick, witi w] icV to measure the Navy's contribution to the
aci lavement oi foreign policy soals. II us, it is an en-




U. . FT ChJ UTHEASI
ASIA, 1945-60
There is always a grave risr involved in tryir state
simply the goals ol any national iorei One is
likely t ersimpliiy the complexities and minimize the
incens is t enc ies .
1
With this caveat in mind an endeavcr will be made in
this dapter to trace the development o£ U. . n policy
in Southeast Asia during the first liiteen years subsequent
to World war II* Emphasis will be placed on the objectives
^_ \merlcan policy in tie region* In order to put these
jectives to er context* some reference will be made
to U.St objectives as they applied tc the Far East in
general*
e Failure eration
wit*- t'r - : vigt Union
i.v45*-*/
I period of co-operation with the Soviet Union
lasted from tie Japanese surrender aboard the Missouri in
Tokyo Bay until the j renouncement oi the Xruman Doctrine in
March. L94?« Alter repeated eiiorts to honorably accommo-
date itself to the claims and policies 01 the Soviet Union,
i
Robert Scalar inc, ted States and Japan.
. a United States and' the Far Last (Kew York: published for




the direction of the United States changed to reilect new
objectives*
The principal American objectives at this end oi
world War II were: (1) settlement with the enemy states,
(2) reconstruction of the liberated states. (3) the laying
2
oi" the groundwork for international order, lie policy
utilized to acMeva these objectives was based on the
idealistic assumptions that had bean characteristic oi U.S.
rei^n policy during tie war,
• , . That peace, prosperity, freedom, and justice could
be given a universal mean In,.... tl at en so defined these
goals would be soi Uy all men and that the only re-
quirement for their achievement was tl at governments
, , . should w armoniously and co-operatively,
3
That this policy would not hold up under the real-
ities and strains oi world politics soon became evident,
"This approach to the post-war international settlement
limped along tor two years, when it finally collapsed under
the weight mf the manliest evidence that both the major
problems end the chieii assumptions were not the relevant
ones."
4 President Truman's message to the Congress on
March 12, lf47. proposing aid lor threatened Turkey and
beleaguered Greece marked the formal end oi the Soviet-
American honeymoon,
*Jbeitzel, Kaplan, Coblenx, *2.
*Reit«el, Kaplan, CoL/lens, 83,
.oy Macridis, Eoref :-;n hollcy in World H>litfcs
(kin lewocd CI ifis: frent ice-Kail, 1958), p. -*00.
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The most pressing Immediate U.S. objective in the
Far Last was the liquidation 01 the administrative \robl<
ieit in the wake oi the Japanese surrender. This essential
task, a rrerequisice tc •*• laying of the groundwor Cos in-
ternational order , was a^ravated by the quick and partially
unexpected termination oi the war in August 1945. The prin-
cipal farts oi tits task included: (1) tie disarming and
repatriation of Japanese troops and nationals, (2) the trans-
fer oi newly liberated territories from Japanese to Allied
administration, (3) the re-activation of transport lacill-
ties in the &re& $ including the sweepi many war-
time minefields, (4) the prevention oi famine and pestilence
that threatened as a result of the collapse of the Japanese
occupation machinery.
The shift irom Japanese to Allied government In some
areas was to be the source oi many serious problems. Just
prior to the Japanese surrender the boundaries oi General
MacArthur's theater oi operations in the Southwest Pacific
were altered so that much ot Southeast Asia was made t
responsibility oi Admiral Hountbatten^ Southeast Asia Com-
and* As a result, the ilrst Allied forces landing in
Java, Malaya, and southern Indc-CMna were British, Native
5Amry Vandenl and .Lichard * - utwell, ast
Asia Areon:; the jjf>r3'^ *'wers (Lexx: t: University oi
tucky :ress, 1^57), \. . 2S2. rics, except for
scattered Japanese resistance, lad already been re
:
;^ined by
American forces. Taiwan and Ton! in were occupied by CMnese
Nationalist torces shortly after the Japanese surrender.

13
populations In Southeast Asia were not Inclined to welcome
back their ioraier colonial masters- -or t\ ail temporary
agents, Britlsf military iorces. Tba snorts at the old
colonial powers tc re-establish the status quo ante beHum
became a prima source c. iticai instability in a scut -
east Asia ablaze with the llamas oi nationalism lindled by
Japanese policies.
In April 1946 President 1rumen reviewed tie situs*
tion in the i-ar Last as a whole and set torch the speciiic
post-war objectives • United btates in the region:
(1) political rehabilitation oi Japan, (2) tie establishment
an independent and democratic Korea, (3) a democratic and
. itically unliied Crina, (4) independence »l the t-hili -
pine Commonweal tii, (5) economic rehabilitation oi all Asian
states, (6) restoration oi a normal tlow oi trade*
Although somewiat successful in achieving some oi
these objectives, as in Japan and the Phlllf-pines, by mid-
1946 it was apparent that Soviet foreign policy goals in the
Far Last, as elsewhere, were inconsistent with those oi the
United Stat. -as. This clash was most obvious in those re-
gions, suet as Manchuria and Korea, where the sovie t I'nion
was maintaining sizeable military iorces.
In Southeast Asia the Soviet Union sought to exacer-
bate an already unstable political situation in the colonial
ddress by the * resident,' 1 Department oi State
Bulletin . XXI (April 14, 1944), 623.
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areas xormerly under Japanese control. Making a strenuous,
en successful , exiort the Soviet Lnion attempted to iden-
tiiy itselx with the burgeoning nationalism ox Asia, fa
exploit the unsettled conditions In Southeast Asia the So-
viet Union aimed a steady stream of propaganda at the re*
cion, conducted an opportunistic campai-:
:
,n ol political
sniping at the returniv< onial powers and the United
7
States, and abetted insurrection. I! e continued political
Instability hampered economic rehabilitation; the lac
economic progress In turn engendered further political dif-
ficulties.
The United States attempted to walk the narrow line
between a natural sympathy lor the national aspirations oi.
the people oi tbe region and a concern £o* the interests ox
its western European allies. These allies were convinced
that their post-war recovery depended to a considerable
degree on the retention of their productive colonies in
Southeast Asia.
• initial I - . response to this dilemma was a
"hands o.. oiiey. American military power was withdrawn
from the area. In an act ox great dramatic Impact on the
peoples oi Southeast Asia the United States luliilled its
promise oi Independence lor the Philippines. Concurrently
'Claude , -..use, The Par fc.a»t (^*ew York: hacmilian,
1955), pp. 676-77, 667-91, and Joseph Franhei.
icy ii, .heast Asia," Soviet iolicv in the iar i.ast. r




with these moves the returning colonial powers, usually with
i end-lease equipment obtained during world war II, attempted
as best they could to impose lorcibly the status quo ante
beHum in souti east Asia.
From an initial position oi complete m rt for the
concept of national self-determination the United States,
under the impact oi: tie exigencies oi the cold war, was
reed to retreat to a position oi only qualified support
for Uat objective, ; rotesscr Buss states: "Asians lost
coniidence in the United States as the champion oi the
•tree,' alter the compromises wit? hated colonialism in
Indonesia and IndQ-China." His less of coniidence turned
to antagonism in some states as the cold war forced the
United States to take more energetic measures--collective
security agreements and military deployments- -to dei'end the
tree world. To most Southeast Asians these measures were
reminiscent oi the jockeying oi the colonial powers during
the years prior to b* orld Wars. In them they saw a
threat to their newly-won independence.
As a result oi the political warfare waged by the
Soviet Union bctl in Europe and in /-sia, the American policy
o£ international co-operation was faced with bankruptcy ii
j.ncif.Les were to be maintained and vital objectives
achieved, ihe year 1947 proved to be a momentous one as
Claude A. &uss, »*out heas t Asia and t'. e world loday
inceton: D« Va»'. - .rand," £15$), p. '

16
American lorelpn policy veered oil in a new direction. Many
che objectives remained the same, but tbe policy and the
assumptions on w! ich it was based were vastly different.
a Centss if- 01 ontainm
Volley. i^l^U
By 1**47 inlormed public opinion as well as tbe Amer-
ican leaders nd come to realize that the Soviet Union
represented the major obstacle to the realization oi the
lor policy objectives ot the United States. Events in
Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe, Turkey, Greece, Iran, China
and Korea bad laid bare the basic incompatibility of Ameri-
can and Soviet objectives.
Within the Government an awareness was widely developed
of the importance oi relating intentions and capabili-
ties* Either objectives had to be deilned in more lim-
ited terms or capabilities had to be brought to a
reater condition oi readiness lor use.^
Tie American policy designed to tit these requirements and
to meet the Soviet challenge has been called containment*
Its adoption by the United States represented a major turn-
ing point in its iorei^n policy.
The containment concept, although implemented sev-
eral months earlier in the decision to aid Greece and Turkey,
was siven its most authoritative and icrceiul public presen-
tation in July 1S**7 by its architect, Mr. George Kennan, in
10
a remarkable article in "*-crelan Aliairs . ~ Inasmuch as
I
-jitzei, tCaplan, Coblenz, V3.
10,1 aorge t . Kennan], "The Sources viet
Conduct, " forein /..liairg
.
(July, I ^7), 566-62.
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kennan was then C\ iei. ox the olicy Manning St*.
Department oi state, his article was considered as present-
ing the ci.icial view ci tie tnited States Government.
The heart ot the Kennan thesis was that "the main
element ci any tnited states policy towards the Soviet Lnion
must be that oi a long tern patient but lira and vi llani
I
I
containment ussian expansionist tendencies."
containment was "designed to confront tie Russians wit!
unalterable counteriorce at every point where they show
signs oi encroaching upon the interests oi a peaceiul and
stable world." Ihe strategic objective oi containment
gave rise to the tactical objectives ot Loraing positions
strength among the free nations on the periphery ci the
Soviet empire. These tactical objectives were to be accom-
plished through political, economic and military power.
cept ior a briei flirtation with the "roll-bac
and "liberation" concept In 1953, containment remained the
cornerstone of United States foreign policy in tie years
lowing the Second «or!d ^er, With the rise oi Communist
China, the containment concept was expanded to take in Ccm-
munist governments anywhere.
S ilrst oilicial maniiestation oi c« niainraent in
American icreign policy was President Truman* s message to





to Greece and lur* ey in order to assist them in resisting
13Soviet threats. Although this policy, to become known as
the Iruman Doctrine, was not provoked by developments in the
Far East, the events in that region termed a significant
t
art of the milieu in w the Doctrine was formulated.
Containment as an objective and t uman Doctrine as a
policy r layed signiiicant parts in subsequent American com-
mitments in . vast Asia.
The President was explicit in detining the scope of
his doctrine. "It must be tie ioreign policy si the United
States to support tree peoples who are resisting attempted
14
subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure.
President's message made it clear that containment was not
to be implemented by American sftorts alone; other tree
nations were t». be given United States assistance in meeting
Comtrunist agression.
Containiuent was sucee- . . . arshall
Flan, the tkrth Atlantic Treaty, end oder steps towards
economic, volitical and military integration converted west-
ern Europe ircm a dangerous power-vacuum into a position ol
rapidly growing strengtl • The economic recovery was partic-
ularly heartenir.
13Samuel s. Stratton, rami cid Test oi Contain-
«*»t," USjSi; -. LXXV1II (March, 1952), 2
1**
"Secofaaendations on Greece and Turkey,' Department
otate Bulletin , XVI (harch 23, 1947), 536.

15
iartlally as a result oi American pre-occupation
with e 9 8 serious problems * the situation in Asia was
less satisfactory. One writer observed: "• . • Though the
basic idea oi containment was accepted in lis 7, no real at-
tempt was made to implement the theory in Asia until alter
15
the collapse oi Ci-ina." a ovei wever, is
the iact chat the pelideal climate and economic environment
post-war Asia was iar diiierent irom that oi Europe*
These tacts greatly iniluenced the manner in which the con-
tainment concept was applied to Asia*
In the years alter the war u-e united States ielt
that "demands lor national salt -determination had to be met
a peaceful world was to be achieved."
• . . .'his bread policy position was not si.?niiicantiy
modified by the hirst formulation, of con-
tainment* Consequently, alleles oi assistance and
alliance that arose ainment
underwent strange cfan.^es as they were a] ..n re-
ions and to situations in which were operating another
ran^a ox purposes derived largely irom general prin-
ciples of self-determination."
His conflict ^jectives was characteristic of American
icies in Southeast Asia*
e post-war power-vacuum created by ti • destruction
oi Japanese military forces and tha continued weakness of
China in the iaca of civil strife was an advantage that t
Marshall Knap-.. en. m\ Introduction to American
icy (Sew Yor | <3ros., U5o), :; . .*£:'•:•
16




Soviet Union exploited thoroughly . Although the loss
China was quite possibly the result oi factors \uwt~
ic&n control, p.iven the nature of the nationalist Government
and the post-war chaos in China, the Communist conquest did
lorce tie United States te re-examine the containment objec-
tive as it applied to Asia. As in Europe, deiense against
Communist agression required governments that were strong
politically and economically as well as militarily,
ii e conquest o. China by Communism and the emergence
of China as a significant military power was to be of i^reat
Importance to Southeast Asia. This portion ot the continent
was no longer remote from the cold war^ it had become the
sensitive iront line of ideological and military conflict.
The geo ;ra- < xe*liy remote subversive threat oi the Soviet
Union was re-inlorced bf the immediately adjacent subversive
and military threat or powerful Communist China.
e loss of China reread the United states to apply
the containment concept more rigorously in Asia. In Janu-
ary 1950, while "waiting tor the dust to settle," the United
States deiense perimeter in I Mr East was outlined
the Secretary oi State. This perimeter, or containisent-
barrier, was based on the Last Asian island chain extendi
irom tie Aleutians to Japan, the kyukyus and the 'I kill -
pines. aaaitments *?ere undertaken or? the Asian
1 ?
Dean Acheson [jr*emarks by the Secretary oi State
at the National Press Club], "Crisis in Asia," itepartment
oi State Bulletin
. XXXXX (January 23, 1930), 111-1.
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mainland nor was the Chinese Nationalist arrison on Taiwan
placed under Che American security umbrella. Those parts ol
I si* not under Communist domination or guaranteed American
protection were leit to detend themselves or to rely on the
United Nations lor their security. V. • Secretary declared:
i:ar as the military security of other areas in t>e
uiiic is concerned, it must be clear that no person
can ;ijarantefc ti ose areas a ;alnst military.' attack. But
it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly
necessary or within the realm c act leal relationship.
hould an attack occur . . . the Initial reliance
must be on the people attacked to resist it and then on
• commitments ol the entire civilized world under the
arter of the United Nations.
That this conservative and restrictive interpretation
containment was not adequate to deter Communist agression
was made apparent by the subsequent events in Korea and
Indo-China. Southeast Asia with its unstable political
situation ^resented an open invitation to Communist sv
version and conquest.
Limited war. 1950-^
Durin years between IV50 and LtSft the basic
20
security objective o£ the United States remained itficbanged.
Containment remained the long*rutt objective; tactical objec-
tives changed rapidly as a result of shifts in the military
situation.




Prior to the summer of 1950 the United States tad
not been forced to flgl t to implement its containment objec-
tive. The attack on the Republic of Korea by t>« North
Korean regime i creed the Lnited States to re-emphasise mili-
tary dexense, oiten at the ex^gnse of economic rehabilita*
tion and development.
A general strategy oi containment designed Co operate
_r a long period of time was converted Into a specitic
strategy £or meeting a Soviet threat Chat could become
war within a deiinea period oi time. • • • The goals *1
economic recovery rams were gradually displaced by
the more pressin claims oi r* rams to rebuild the
military strengl iree nations, and a policy
military aid and defensive alliances was expanded to
include precise commitments saerican £orcaa«**
• development o£ American objectives 1 #a
alter June 1950 is outside the scope oi this study. ce
it tc say that tVe initial objective of the Lnited States in
Rorea was to demonstrate t 1 I . irmness • American com-
mitment to the containmeni active as implemented by the
22iicy o£ collective security.
aa a truce was finally arran;:i«d in the summer
1953, the bnited states joined vi iteert o\ ^embers t
the United Nations that * ad commit orc«£ he deiense
of the h ic of iCorea in afiir that:
li there is a renewal < I armed attack . . .
be united and prompt to resist. Tha consequences of
21
Keitzel, Kei'lwn y ?., 2aM -
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Farry . ruman, Meoolrs (Garden City: DouLleday,
1S56), II, 33-*, ,
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such a breach 01 the armistice would be so grave that in
all probability it would not be possible to coniine hoa-
tilities within the ^rentiers oi Korea. 23
e Korean War in drawing the attention 01 the world
to the Far £ast emphasized otter critical points on the con-
tainment barrier. Among these points were int - ina and
Xaiwen.
Indc-Crina
Although the wariare in Korea was on a greater
scale, the contiict in Indo-CV ina between frtaol Union
iorces and Viet Mini insurgents tad been waged with little
interruption since 1V46. Until 1950 the righting in Int.
ina was oi comparatively small concern to tte tnited
States except as it retarded £ ranch economic recovery and
weakened her military strength in Europe* e American
involvement in Korea the flghtl&g in Indo-China was put into
perspective as merely an extension • Korean tront in
Southeast Asia. In the acme statement in w! ich he committed
American naval and air xcrces to Korea on June 27, 1950,
asident Truman signiilcantly '-directed acceleration in the
ralshiag ,:i military assistance to i . .rces oi France
and the Associated States in Indo-China and tie dispat
e
a military mission to provide close wo> relations with-
the. fores."24
icy? basic Occuments. Ifr5i>lfe55 (Washington: I.:-, "overn-
menc I rint: s.ce), li t 2662.
2Sruman, II, 335-5 .
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American objectives in Indo-China were consistent
with the strategic objective oi containment. Ihe speciiic
tactical objectives varied, as in Korea, with the military
and political situation. In Korea the United States tad
xound it necessary to reconcile its objectives with those
its United Nations allies. In Indr.-c) ina the United States
did not ci oose tt intervene directly because a inese Commu-
nist aggression was less clear-cut and was intertwined w.
the crowing nationalism oi the peoples oi the - n. In-
stead the United States attempted to realize its securi:
objectives through financing the Frenr repulse
Communist aggression.
As at other times and in other r laces since the end
of World War II, the United States was iaced in Indo-Chiaa
with a clash between objectives. active of support-
ing; the principle of salt -determination caoillcted I Cm*
25
objective oi containin the torema of Comajunisiii. Since
French and American objectives r.sd essentially only one
^nt o.i. tangency--opposition to Ccsacunist ntmlf leUiHl I
Southeast Asia—American objectives were mftmm only inciden-
tally related to the direction S Irrenc sraa in
Inc aa.
25
"Tor an official re< uion oi this dilemma, see
Dean Rush's address "The Underiyir of Far last-
ern lolicy, Department i tate Bulletin ." xxv (November 1
1951), pp. &22-23.
26
••Rupert Emerson in his preface Ten J. Hammer's
The strundle wr Indo-Ci ina (Staniurd: Stamford university
:ress, 1554), r r>. xi-xiii.
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e principal American objectives in Indo-China
: (i) elimination of Communist insurgent forces
,
(2) the formation oi governments in the states of Indo-CMna
that wculd be capable oi resisting Communist encroachment
27
and subversion. ' lie United States felt thai: in order to
ac! ieve tbis latter tlv«4 it would la. necessary to
^rant the states oi Indo-Cnina couple ./liticai independ-
ence. Until April L9S4 i ranee was not willing to go
t'r is iar. A primary fraud objective was the maintenance
of a degree ax control over the Indc -ese states."
After the tall of Dienbienphu in the spri. l$5* duri,
the Geneva Conference on Asian I rob leas, the trend objec-
tive of maintaining an enlightened seai-cslcnial protector-
ate in Inc na became impcssii 3d in the
French capabilities.
-meva settlement ending the fight
in* made it lapoaaible to *el lave . *ly either
America: •rctiv. . *pite . rtaeYa part
of Viet Nam to the Communist*, a ati*. as later events
were to prove) anti-Communist ;;overoiaent am
emerged irom the peace settlement. ftAch semi*colonial
Joi . iXilles, "The issues at Geneva," Depart-
ment of State Bulletin
, (May 17,
Ibid.
pal Instltut International n-oc -
tive t>eience' in southeast Asia (London: rd University




regime wee at an end and the path was cleared "tor the
construction 01 an anti-Communist containment front in Asia
on a iirai political basis that otherwise would have been
impossible."^ e signing of the Southeast Asia Col-
lective Defense Treaty in September lf$4 9 the iree portions
Indo-Cr ina—composed ot Cambodia, South Viet Nam and
Laos- -came under the protective mantle o£ a collective
security system backed by the Lnited states.
Taiwan
Alter the debacle el i$^9 Nationalist Chinese rem-
nants iad sought reiuge em Taiwan where thay carried i
desultory harassment of the new Communist regime on the
mainland* in the ioi lowing months Taiwan uma ot _, e
31United states-supported containment barrier. It then
seamed only a matter *!«•• ek*s o -
ernment succuubed to invasion or rev
Alter the Coomunist invasion c lc oi
Korea rresident Truman in the same statement in which be
ordered American sea and air assistance to the peninsula
also announced a change in American policy towards I
regime on iaiwan.
I lave ordered the Seventh Fleet event any
attach on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I





cease all air and sea operations against the mainland*
Use Seventl Fleet will see that this is done. 32
This announcement, popularly called "leashing Chiang, H
articulated an objective that was to be a cardinal point
in American tormi alley ~hc rems . - decade*
Briefly stated this objective was: Taiwan and the Pes-
cadores out oinniunist 1 ands*
Shortly after assuou in IS53 ; reside:
Elsenhower temporarily "unleashed |V :
... e is o Lc or mi Ja a condi-
tion that requires the united States Navy to assume
defensive responsibilities on be! -oes*
Communlsts • • • •
I aa, I instructions that the .:•-
ench Fleet no longer be employed to shield Cosrutunlst
. ina* vsrmlt nc
order implies no aggressive intent on our part* but we
certainly have no Leu L ct a nation t-
ing us in Korea* 33
This move was clearly intended to encourage the Chinese Com-
munists to come to terms in Korea* This phase* which appar-
ently did not have any appreciable affect on the outcome in
Korea, outwore its practical utility upon completion ox the
Korean fightlag* the signing of a mutual security
treaty with the Government of the Republic oi China on Tai-
wan in December 1954 and a subsequent exchange of diplomatic
notes, Chiang was formally constrained irom attacking the





*"'iext ox Notes £xcl an*,ed on December 10," Depart-
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Tie Paciilc Ml lance SYStefr
e Korean War marked a turning point In \merlcan
attitudes towards collective security In the Paciilc and the
Jar best. ihe modest nature of the collective security com-
mitments undertaken by tie United States la fe region prior
to the summer of 1950 is evident in Secretary Ad eson'e fa-
mous National I ress Club Speech of January 12, 1%50, In v
35he outlined the American detense perimeter in Che Par East.
The threat posed by Communist Imperialism in the in-
vasion of the Reputile of Korea forced the United Ettfti
accept tht responsibility tttt fafrrttt t€ free Asia. I
alternative wss to stand ty and watch Sino-Scviet aggression
devour the <\sian continent. Alter ace*: onal-
bility the United States chose to implement its decision by
the alliance system that it had used in the <-\mericas and in
wastem Europe.
h not without difficulties, the security
structures of ti e Atlantic community were much more tightly
knit than were thai* Kaat Asian counterparts. diverse
characteristics and special problems of the nations of free
Asia and the Western pacific necessitated several treaties
to meat the different conditions conironcin various
36parties interested in \slan defense. ~ven so, several








tie so-called "neutralist" nations oi Asia were hostile to
any suet western-sponsored collective security arrangements*
In large measure this hostility was the result o£ their un-
happy colonial experience, *'urtt..«r f as a result ox skillrul
Soviet and 61 inese communist loreign policy, some oi the new
states oi Asia did not stare the alarm cl the United States
37
concerning the Communist menace.
lie United States during the years 1951 tl.rough 1954
concluded six collective security treaties in £ast Asia and
the Western aciiic. In these agreements, binding eleven
nations, the United States was the key partner inasmuch as
it was the only power capable of rendering substantial mili-
tary and economic aid to any threatened party.
The effect I -:;se treaties was to extend and for-
aalize the containment barrier. As a result, American
objectives were increased in number and deiined more pre-
cisely. Hie United States undertook to delend, In elface,
entirety ot East Asia not already under Communist domi-
nation. These commitments were without precedent in American
history. Two oi these treaties are oi special significance
3S
to Scutl east >sia and will be considered in some detail.
37
Hoi lis U 9 Barber, "United states Alliances East
Suez," USMIP . 1_ (July, 193$), 72-73.
3*
The Mutual £>eiense Ireaty between the bnited
States and tie M« (August 30, 1951) is not dis-
cussed because its most important obligations are included
in the Southeast ^sia Collect ivo Deleoee Treaty t.
both nations are parties.

30
He southeast Isla Ccllective Defense Treaty . - -Th is
treaty was the reaction of the United States to the threat
rtt er Ccnsnunist expansion into Southeast \sia. Signed
,n September 8, it34 in Manila, it lollowed closely on the
heels oi t encb collapse in Incl ;ia and the subse-
quent Geneva Conierence ot July 1954. arties tc the
utl east Asia Collective Defense Treaty were: Pakistan,
Thailand, tie i hilippines, Australia, New Zealand, Great
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is II— I J. together with its loose organization
. arly called *&fi , ess ed the most ambitious peace-
time attempt at collective security in c t cist.
The Manila pact attempted to salvage whatever stre.
remained lor the xree world in southeast Asia, but it
could not in it sell produce miracles. It cieated no new
military icrces to protect exposed positions . . and
Its ultimate In ;e would depend upon tie will and
the intention ol all the signatory powers to carry forth
its spirit.
-
Article IV, paragraph 1, contained the heart ox the
treaty.
ich larty recognizes that aggression by means I
armed attack in the treaty area against any of the I ar-
ties or against any State or territory which the Parties
by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would
endanger its own peace and saiaty, and agrees that it
will in that event act to eaeet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional processes.
Three states were designated as protected under this arti-
cle: S am, Cambodia and Laos. Because or deiense
commitments undertaken in Malaya by Great britain, the
Federation ox Halaya and the State ol Singapore were, in
eixect, also designated under this article, .\rticle i
paragraph 3, stipulated that no action could be taken by the
treaty signatories on the territory oi a designated state
without the consent ol tie latter.
The boundaries ox Southeast Asia, as deiinea in
Article Vlli ol the pact, are more restricted than those
—«WWi—»w»—w—ww——»——ww»———Minium Hi m ill —«—«wwv n H IIIII MI— I ! Mill IM II I I I iii i.wmwwmw* II lllllllll I !!!
buss, Ihe i'ar a.ast . 71V.





3170 (Was ington: EH . n-
ment irintin ice, 1936), p. 3.
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delimited in Chapter I oi this study.
As used in this ireaty, the 'treaty area' is the
general area I - ast Asia, including also the
entire territories oi the aian iarties, and the gene
area 01 the South-West >aci*ic net Including t ftOlflc
area north oi 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude.41
is deiinition oi the treaty area excluded Hong Kong and
Taiwan iroca the pact, ihe only nations, parties to this
treaty, wit; vtiith the Uniteo States had not h.^d
z
rior c -




f Witt view towards tbm di-.ioultie^
tween India sac -ted states appended a
res- Leu - reaty at the time oi signature stating
that it cons.. ': I?! j,ara ; l f to apply only
..
ii <*-.m ii—iii -Bili m i
- ui.i.; . .... ,, ,. v ^ Vt;ii. ^ tatcs anc ial -
wan ,-~ . j..i- .. . ... Lnese Govei .is
not invited As! • *e
ries had r. ei-
pin., regiate and d* atain re •; re la-
tic . ...t,
ftp in the contain—nt barrier in \sia
anc iseiitamtiiB
tree, ;ited states concluded a mutual de-
fense treaty wit e Chin ^cmmnl . «n« In
^ x Ibld .. 4«
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other collective deiense treaties negotiated by the United
States in the years alter 1950. Tr is treaty clearly defined
the territories covered by its provisions.
The terms •territorial • and •territories 1 shall mean
viur: r^Sf.ect t-A the Republic
Pescadores, and in respect oi the United States
America, the island territories in the West iaciilc
under its jurisdiction.^
Conspicuous by its absence was the lack oi any commitment
by O e Halted states to deiend the oil score islands against
attac .
In an exchange ot notes on j^ecember lo, If34* a wee-.-.
alter the signing el the treaty, Chiangs rranent was
restrained twom operations against the mainland
without American concurrence*
In view el the obligations oi the two Parties unaer
the said treaty, and oi the fact that the use or iorce
(HI ft* oi these areas oy either oi the Parties
aiiects the other, it is agreed that sue ve
will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to the
actions oi an amprg—<y nature which is clearly the
exercise oi the tal erent right oi sell -deiense•**
Stalemate. Ifr5*-60
During these years the United States continued to
base its policy towards the Sino-Soviet bloc on the objec-
tive oi containment. the new \merican administration comx
into oil Ice in 1953 challenged the containment concept as
42
" U«S»f Department or otate 9 treaties and otr er
International -frets
,
..Series^ 317a (Washington: U..- :<, govern-
ment . rintln ice, ls>5e/, .- • '*
luld * , 2<-» •
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sterile and oiiered "liberation" and "roll-back" as alter-
natives* However, this approach was soon abandoned as the
realities of the world situation became more apparent. Con-
tainment remained the primary security objective oi United
States foreign policy in practice, ii not in tl eory. 4^ To
implement containment (or to strengthen the "iree world f s
defense perimeter") the United States continued to rely en
the mobility of sea-air striking forces in Southeast Asia.
ee Robert t« Osgood. Limited War (Chicago: Uni-
versit ass, IS 57 5, : ; » 205-206. For a sea'
in denunciation of the containment policy, sso James
Burnham's containment or Liberation? (New York: John Day,
1952), pp. Zf-41.
Some would challenge the contention that contalnme.
remained the primary security objective o.v I'.S. :orei.?n
policy alter If- 52. new Republican administration ex-
plicitly renounced it as a feature 1 . foreign policy.
In the i brink ssMin si I article appear in;.; in
Lire (January 16, 1956), reportedly based on exclusive
interviews witl Secretary s, James Shepley maintained
(on . 77):
"11.a so-called line of containmen • Iruman
administration had started to build in Greece and Turkey
was no line in in la ill the way
to the Phi lippines.
"8 actively lies plugged the holes that
reedom's defense line Us been llnVed up from Italy to
Japan."
s is apparent from this excerpt, seme c. criti-
cism directed A t icy (ant ctive) was
not that it was the incorrect one, but that it was not
really implemented until the I lican administration took
ice in January 1953.
tltsel, m an , 325-26) hold th*t
containment w^s merely re-detined in more military terms*
Hut tl ty dat
.
• development >m
1953. Other authorities state that there has been no essen-
tial e in i jjectli containment. See Julius W.
Pratt, .- story oi Lnited States Vorel£fl ;-olicy <2Wood
tsf" rentice-; ill, L r;£2j, ;-. 773, and S
Jr., "Collective intense: I -iltary Commitment.
and . . l;.ry in tK s Cc'iA /}* * ed. "mold i *it"





Speaking o , Secretary Dulles stated:
we shall rely chiefly on mobile Allied power \
can strike an aggressor wherever the occasion may de-
mand. That capacity will, we believe, deter aggression.
We shell not need to build up large static icrces at all
points, and the United States contribution will be pri-
marily in terms oi sea and air power. <*5
Following the Geneva settlement of 1954 Coauunist
expansion in Southeast \sla was brought almost to a bait.
Feiping's protege, North Viet Nam, continued its attempts at
subversion in Laos. The Tachens were evacuated by National-
let iorces while the Chinese Communists periodically stepped
up their cams tig* of bombardment and harassment of the o; -
shore islands 01 ueraoy and Matsu. There was evidence oi
creeping Chinese encroachment in northern Burma. Frustrated
in East Asia helping turned its attention to Tibet and
India, conquering the former and antagonizing the latter
with border forays. There were indications throughout Asia
that the menace of Chinese Communist imperialism was oalBf
taken more seriously than it had at the \iro-\sian Confer-
ence at Bandung in 1955.
These expansionist actions (see figure two) of Com-
munist China kept the political temperature of Asia at lever
pitch. Its a^ressive adventures could be considered as
probes of the containment barrier, faced with, internal dil-
ilculcies o£ tremendous magnitude, la flexed its muscles
periodically to keep the pot boiling and, perhaps,
mmmmwmtmmmmmi mm iwn »^iwiii — nia^w—
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distract its long-suiiering population irom troubles closer
to home. Tie emigre government of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan
provided a convenient and logical target Piping's venom*
The conillct between the two governments iocused on their
point 01 closest contact— the oil store islands.
The most serious crises 01 the years alter the
Geneva settlement were the result oi' Communist attacks on
these islands* On two occasions—during the autumn and win-
ter of 1954-55 and the summer and autumn el U-58*«Communl8t
China and tie United States laced each other at the brin
war as a result of aggressive Communist actions In the Strait.
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On bcth occasions the leiping regime was i creed to baci down
beiore American resolution which steamed i rom e determina-
tion not to preside over a Western Pacific "Munich."
Less than two months after the signing of the de-
fense treaty between the United States and the Republic
China, a lull -blown crisis had developed as a result of Com-
munist pressure on the Tachens, a small group of Nationalist'
Veld islands some 200 miles north of Taiwan. The United
States elected to help the Nationalists evacuate the islands;
but to forestall further Ked Chinese moves threatening Tai-
wan, President Eisenhower asked the Congress tor specific
powers concerning the offshore islands. In late January,
1V55, the Congress in a joint resolution authorized the
i resident to use American forces to deny the Chinese Commu-
nists the possession of "such related positions and terri-
tories ©. c area [Taiwan] now in friendly hands."
In his message to the Congress requesting this
authority the President indicated that the United States
considered t ore islands related to the defense
Taiwan and the Tescadores as Ion.- as tie Ptlpiag regime
threatened the "liberation" of Taiwan.
i resident Eisenhower in a speec nation on
September 11, IV 58, stated: "• . .A western tc T u-
Rich* will net buy us peace and security."
47
"Text of Jvint resolution on the Defense of For-
mosa." i/epartment ate Bulletin . XXXII (February 7,
1955;, 213.

MI do not suggest that t xtes enlarge
its defensive obligations beyond Formosa and the Pesca*
dores. • • • But unhappily , the danger ox armed att.
directed against that area compels us to take into
account closely related localities and actions v
under current conditions , might determine the failure
or the success oi such an attac . I authority that
may be accorded by the Congress would be used only in
situations which are recognizable as parts oi, or de,
ni ellmlnaries to, an attr alnsr main posi-
tions oi Xormosa and the Pescadores.^*
From public statements by the President and the
Secretary oi State it appeared that the security of the
EsJ ore islands was only a transitory objective oi the
United States. Secretary julles declared:
• Lnited States lias no commitments and no ose
to deiend coastal positions as sucl . n e bar* ;*e
is to assure that Formosa and tie Pescadores will not
be taken forcibly by che Communists.^*
door was left oj en uture negotiation concerning
disposition of the islands providing the Chinese Communists
were to renounce the us« rce in pursuing their objec-
50
tlves in the Strait. Nevertheless, the wording oi the
various government statements on the American position
relative to the islands was suxxicientiy ambiguous
confuse friend ant; ilfkft* XI i lac'.-, oi precision in
the American commitments gave the helping regime cause
"Message Xrom the l resident to Congress, n Depart-
ment ox State Bulletin , XXXII (i ebruary 7, 1953), 212.
Jc , Dulles, "Our Foreign 1 olicy in Asia,"
Department or State Bulletin . XXXII (February 28, 1955),
32v. Emphasis addedT~
* John . ulles, . allenge to ; eace in the Far




or hesitation in its preparations to seize the oiishore
islands. 31
The determined American stand in tie lace of. Ccwmu-
nist aggression in the Strait , which was a^ain demonstrated
during the crisis of September 1958, was not popular wii.
many nations, including some of the stauncl est allies oi the
United States* Many felt that the Islands were insignifi-
cant and not word: Chi risks oi World War 111, wt lie others
ielt that Chiang's government was not wort., saving and a
small price to pay for 'stability" in *sia# In answering
his critics Secretary Dulles declared:
1 do not doubt that the Chinese Communists are probing
BK resolution, XI ey no doubt hope that we want peace
so ardently that we will retreat in the lace ox their
reats* • • « however, we do not want it at the price
oi our security or ot our honor, indeed experience
stows that these- who try in that way to bu\ r® in
iact only increase the ultimate danger of war,-'*-
r»elusion
Alter the abortive attempt at post-war accommoda-
tion of the Soviet Union, containment became the policy
51Secretary Dulles at a news conierence on Marcs 15,
1955, stated:
It is inevitable that the situation be in some
ambiguity, because, as 1 say, thee* areas Lcuemoy and
Matsuj are outside oi the treaty area and the question
the U.S. use oi lorce for their defense depends upon
the circumstances under which an attack upon them occur,
jaerican iorei ;n . olicy: basic Documents, '55,
XI, 2*§£
52John r. Dulles, lsHutual Defense Treaty with the
^public ihina, srtmaat -ate Bulletin , XXXII
(February 21, 1955), 2b\ - .• .
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the United States in its searct ior security, imminently
successful in Europe, containment was not rigorously applied
in tve rar Last until alter tre iall td China and tie war in
Korea* The events ox ItM ugh 1954 demonstrated to the
Lnited States that more precise and normal commitments oi
American political , economic and military ^ over would be
necessary 11 East Asia, and particularly Southeast Asia,
were to be kept out oi tire Communist orbit* 'Ihe resulting
collective security treaties negotiated by the United States
extended and lorutallzed the containment barrier*
lie intense nationalism oi Southeast Asia during the
years aiter World War 11 presented signii leant diiiiculcies
for American policy in the region. The dilemma between con-
tainment and seli -determination was never satisfactorily
resolved by merlcan policymakers* By I960, i owever, t
colonial powers had been squeeaed out oi most o£ Southeast
Asia and the problem lost some of its importance* Colonial-
ism, nevertheless, remained the tavorite scapegoat I
nationalist leaders In Southeast ••sia and anti-colonialism
still provided a rallying point tov the diverse elements
that composed the new nations of the region*
In the wake oi independence tl»ere was left a heri-
tage ox. suspicion oi fcl t West that | 6 difficult to over*
ae in qs&tBg oi. sues measures as the Colosibo Flan and Foint
Four aid. Xnassiueh as they were the only source of substan-
tial power by which Southeast Asia could be ail iterily
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deiended against the new imperialism oi~ Chinese Communist
expansionism, tl e United States and the other western powers
ware [laced in the unenviable position oi trying to defend
nations that saw no apj. arent threat to their independence
except irom their would-be defenders. Nevertheless, wit
the dawn 01 a new decade in 1960 there did sees to he a
greater appreciation ai the trua menace i amunist aggres-
sion axaong the new nations c >ch&ast Asia*
Significantly 9 the trouble-spots in Southeast Asia
during the years alter 1954 were those areas where the
American security coaxaltenants were ambiguous or contingent.
An example oi the ambiguous commitment was the American
position relative to the offshore Islands in tie Taiwan
Strait, helping could never be sura wi ether or not Ameri-
can iorces would participate in the defense oi Ouemoy and
Hatsu if their invasion were to be attempted. As a result
Communist leaders continually probed American determination
by manutacCuring crises in the region. Each disturbance
strained tie bonds oi Allied unity; but these bonds proved
strong enough to bear the burden.
example conti : commitment was t
American position vis-a-vis the 'designated" states (par-
ticularly Laos) ox the Southeast a Collective Defense
Treaty. According to the treaty a designated stat> Id
be defended only at its own request. A Communist en; ad
ecu;. ^'gtat in sue.- a state would rave *csed several

difficult questions for the United States and it^
allies.
In tie summer c activities - at
Lao rebels, assisted by North Viet Kinase elements, were a
stent source 01 anxiety to t kited ^rnment.
Fortunatel- Laotian ^rnment proved, somewhat unex-
pectedly, determined to maintain its Independence and the
crisis passes e moment, .s Communist prefee mmj well
have been a means of sounding out the extent
;!<mltment in Laos*
By 1SSC this typt robing appeared e a stand-
ard feature of tie environment in Southeast Asia, years
following tie wars in Korea and Xndo-C! in set the pat-
tern to be pursued in ewe tin;;, the Communis . r its
effectiveness this pattern o£ firm counter-pressure rested




Bfl TRltt&NT OF FOSEICH POLL
m THB COU3 v
.... rracteristic ..ival forces is their
versatility. In all-out war they can carry out a
diversity - . . In , eacetime and in periods
of localised hostility, naval :orces can carry out a
numbe. same vessels that provide
essential support to friendly nations under attach
,
It very presence discourage an attack on one
of our allies, can undertake such other missions as
tllclng rean truce, rendering assistance to e
civil population when an earthquake" or otrer disaster
strikes, and kring U the ports of a
friendly power to play tie rcle d will emissar-
ies* wide ran;;e or activities is vitMn the
ability ot: navel torces. They do not depend en any
single w y can
undertake tasks short at i uj.1 scale
varlare in furthers!) United States £orei
policy.*
In this c le c& .. itles o* one of the
instruments of national policy is examined; that instrument
is naval power. Particular emphasis Will oe placed on the
diversity .and gradation of naval capabilities and their
application to contemporary situations. the em-
sis of this study is centered on the United States is
Defense, "Semi-Ajnnuel Report oi
the Secretary of the Navy," Seml»-.nnua; the Secre -
tary ol Oei-cnse, . WuneTO. I$54 . 3V 5%. :. . l'5&-^.
. innefeid, "The Cold ower Spec-
trum," U@UP. LXXXVI (January, I960;, 71-7V or a condensed




on instrument »f American foreign policy, attention in this
chapter is directed to the capabilities of modern navies in
general in order to place those oi the United States Navy in
a broader context*
loiiaX c 3 and - 'Ai:- :
e instruments i -uay be likened to
• inscruufci. i sya, stra* statesman acts
as eonduccc - . "music M belore him is >reign policy
oi . l« -stra" is composed of many dijLi'erent
instruments* Amon -ia are the state* s economic resources,
political prestige, allies and anae...
conductor is ti -eve I napoa#*f«
I e composer If - . . ...cai leaders c
nation who aeoerts imiiate the national aspira-
tions and under . _o achieve those within the bounds c
possibility*
Clearly the statesman* political leader, conduct
and composer must ca. abilities and limitations
the instruments carry out their intentions I
suit is to be an «l sign pel icy m 1 armonious
melody* democracies f where aions are
quickly suns - , It 1
r the people themselves to . ave a rudimentary adge
ot abilities e£ the instruments . ore! -icy*
modern navy la one more imports
meats _cy* cularly true of
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nations sucr as the United states ave axtenslve
defense responsibilities and rely heavily on imports t
strategic raw materials.
To be most eiiective, tie navy as an instrument
:icy, muse ; °ve its I .ions co-ordinated wi.
the other elements 01 national power. Naval strategy "as
a pare or instrument si national policy, • . must c
linate the use oi its ssiftl Is and methods vJ ha
rms c . ional | ower to promo' levenmnt
3
cf national objectives. *
having stated that the modern navy is an important
instrument oi foreign p< and . it its use must
be co-ordinated wi. . . er sis—Bte e over,
it is nec<£i the manner in rcise
naval ies may act 1eve national i as< In
Is contc Lsa gradations ower tha I modern
navy can exert assume great significance.
The tower Spectrum
Many writers on military subjects have used the
power spectrum device to indicate the gradations oi power
available to a state in implementing its foreign pellcy*
3
ay , , Naval Strategy Today, rassay*
a
8 (London: iiam Clowes & ions, ivSfe), p. i&.
4
•jBong many others see Henry t« Kissinger, Nuclear
v-.ea^oiis me .v r. v licy (hiew Yorks n >.,
195/), pp. lb, l46j \ndrew >yorgy, "The Nature and CI arac-
ter oj- International Politics,* Naval War College Review ,
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buch a concept is usetul inset ar as it demonstrates the
rang* end diversity oi available power instruments cr
methods, turtrer, the spectrum illustrates tie iact that
there is ccnsiderable middle ground between unrestricted
war and a condition where moderate amounts ^er are
exerted. "Like the other tools and techniques, military
capabilities cover a vide spectrum of capabilities irora tie
mere Tint oi a threat on OM pole to mass destructive war
s
on the other.
tie a serviceable and vivid concept, tie power
spectrum 1 as received little systematic treatment. The
analogy of the power spectrum to the light spectrum of o. -
tics is only a point irture. In the light spectrum
green will always lie between yellow and bluej in the power
spectrum various capabilities may e>. e places or be
identical depending n vmlmn jud^aients oi top-level
decision makers.
a scale oi increasing intensity in the use or
left to right, , situations
calling tor the use oi armed lorce night be arranged in a
XI (hay, 1S5V), 14-20, Anthony t. Sokol , %ar and tr .-m,"
Marine Cor act to , il ( 57),
, | • 12-13.
5 lea M. Forguaaon, Jr.. I tary iorces and
National Objectives, 1 " American Military Policy, ed. Edgar
Fumiss, Jr« (Mew York! kinehart, i.s37), p*^ 12b.
Bu adrew y*s treatment pectrura
of Conflict" (*rorgy, L4-I0) "and William J. Piatt's
lo^ue to I ectrua Conflict. SKI Journal [Stanford
Research Institute], III (Fourth Quarter, lV5v), 113-17.

^7
partial spectrin at indicated in ligure three* Ihe precise
ordering ot capabilities would vary witl the situation*
example, the navigation by American nuclear submarines under
the ice at the North tola bad some ei tie attributes o£ a
scientific demonstration, but tie implications to Soviet
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I gradations between limited and unrestricted war
have been thoroughly examined by many writers* Tie part of
tie spectrum to the leit oi limited war has been compara-
tively neglected in contemporary literature. Yet, the left
side of the military power spectrum comprises the well-wcrii
arsenal Of the cold war.
To consider only one side of the spectrum is some*
wl at unrealistic since the effectiveness ox many measures
on the left depend uj.on tie threat of, and willingness t
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use, the right side ii necessary. Diplomacy has been called
7
"negotiation" with war as a possible alternative.
nee diplomacy w is not related to a plausible en*
t?ymefti rce is sterile, it must be the task of our
military poiic develop a doctrine and a capability
tor : raduated employment v .ce.8
Deter. . ion te | rotect vital interests is best
evidenced by the deployment oi instruments em*
ploying, ultimate sanctions ta toet those interests*
• selection oi ti.es wost soq osed regions ex western
c.urope tor maneuvers by the combined forces of the
..stern allies demonstrates to c s
military power of the Western Alliance and the reso-
lution to use this power in deiense of tie status quo
in Western Europe.
9
iechnoiO:..y and the Spectrum
nents oi land and air power, usually the lat-
ter, irequentiy belittle the advantages oi naval power by
inc. in?, to I .eat tec .^ancements in their
respective iielcs. I uite often these advancements are only
in the drawir. xrd stage; irequentiy lorgotten is the tact
that naval technology has kept pace with developments in i
er military services. Indeed, in the important timid oi
nuclear power the United States Wavy has been in the van-
guard of research and development. Significantly, the Navy
, 156.
^Kissinger, 2ol.
sm J. Morgenthau, olitlcs Amofjr Katlcns (Hew
York: AHred \. K.v 1956 )'j p. 7$.

has been the first service to combine nuclear propulsion
with military weapons systems*
11 roe areas oi technological development in partic-
ular have expanded the modern navy f s capabilities. Ibe first
of these is the naval air-missile stri. e capability which
has made it possible lot naval power to exert torce far in-
land. In iact. tar Evesj having been superseded by the ad-
vent oi nuclear -missile weapons systems, naval power by 1960
10
sed a threat to land power unparalleled in hist ry.
modern navy, by virtue ci its mobility and ability to con-
ceal itseli, has to a considerable degree outdistanced land-
air power in oi tensive power. Ihis expanded strike capa-
bility of naval power can be exerted in the form ot threats,
deterrents, and actual attacks. The possession of this
capability lends authority to the exercise s>4 power on the
: side os. the spectrum.
it e second field In whici- technological advancement
has ' reatly broadened the navy f s capabilities las been in
•apt ibious wartare. iways a usetul weapon in the naval
arsenal, amphibious assault reached a high degree of devel-
.uent during the Second World War. ,«o8t-war innovations
included tie introduction ot the vertical envelopment con-
cept that permitted che projection ot naval landing tea
(usually marines) to areas behind conventional landing
ie
* Oskar :»._r -enstcrti, "thg ^:^ theory in U« . Karat"
*gy» une . .c tevaoer, . 127, 23C-32.

Nbead es. This technique utilised specially designed
helicopter carriers and troop-cargo carryini?, heliccj ters.
The final technological advance to be considered is
that made in the logistic support at naval operating forces.
The endurance characteristics inherent in the a$e of sail
were to a ; reat degree sacrificed with tie introduction of
vessels powered solely by steam. The long tragicomic cruise
of the Russian Baltic Fleet to tie Far East in 1905 demon-
strated the iifl iculties inherent in a cruise far £ro»
friendly bases* In many respects these din iculties were
overcome by United States naval forces during *orld War II.
In the Pacific Ocean campaigns of 1942- practicality
and development of mobile logistic support were amply demon-
strated. The statesmen of today employing the navy as an
instrument o£ national policy do not have to be acutely
soLicitous of the need for bases as were their late nine-
teenth century predecessors. Alt some adequate over-
seas bases remain necessary for tie $reat naval powers, they
are not the "ball and chain" that they were fifty years a.vo.
Other technological advances have also broadened the
spectrum of naval capabilities in the era oi t Id war.
Much could be written on the contribution cf the helicopter
alone. He characteristics and requirements of that air-
craft lend themselves well to the naval milieu. Future
developments in this and in other vehicles and weapons
systems will undoubtedly further extend Cl • rcftgC and diver-




Most naval capabilities on the left side oi t
power spectrum (measures short of war) have, perhaps I
frequently, teen subsumed under the heading oi "si owing the
ilag. I rase I as been api lied, often indiscrimi-
nately, to indicate good will visits, armed threats, or
humanitarian assistance undertaken by naval forces. To
many persons showing the Hag" has become synonymous with
the peace-time mission oi navies.
s a generic term lor the peace-time uses and capa-
ities of naval power "showing the flag* is inadequate to
express the precise gradations oi power that the modern navy
has been exerting in the contemporary world oi twlllgl t be-
tween peace and war, mother objection to this phrase is
that in some parts oi ti .e world it has tie undesirable aura
discredited imperialism*
In the following sections several modern naval capa-
bilities in the cold war and their relationship to the power
spectrum will be examined* The capabilities have been cate-
gorised to /. icilitate discussion, but the continuum of the
spectrum should be kept in mind*
Aid to Miles
In this category is placed all military aid to an-
other state short of actually engaging in armed conflict
with its enemy* In history this assistance has been very
close to actual participation in I •stilities and has
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been considered an uniriendly act by the state against eftiii
the aid was directed*
Naval capabilities in this category can be subdi-
Jad into operations and logistics, under operations are
i.ound: (1) escort oi allied shipping and aire. (2) re-
connaissance and intelligence, (3) the tying down ol enemy
rces by maneuver and atabi^;uous intention. Ifea merican
naval escort provided in iV5i to vessels el the fcayublle
na sailing to besieged C^»eBioy was an example oi the es-
cort capability. During world war 11, prior to merican
entry, sighting reports by American aircraft of German naval
rces were made available to the Koyal Kavy • Tie {maneuvers
conducted by the Italian ileet prior to Italian entry in t
war were examples oi tying down I .eet oi tbe enemy o£ an
ally* ^ignii leantly, a ileet • cy does
not even I ave to maneuver; all that is necessary Is that it
be situated adjacent to the enemy's vulnerable areas.
-3 less dramatic, tie h. cs aspect oi aiding
allies has h^m. frequently the more important part Is
category. Under this leading would be placed! (1) V
training ci allied naval personnel, (2) the supply t *.p»
and otler naval equipment, ammunition, iuel, \ revisions,
stores, and parts, (3) the usa&e oi bases £or repair *»nd
Maintenance, (4) the transport of s* as and personnel.
amount el aid, bot rial and logistic,
rendered in tl is portion of the spectrum can be graduated
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very precisely, lerhaps Che classic example oi suet assist*
ance vas the gradual American entry into tie Battle of the
antic during World War II* While still a non-belligerent
the United states under lollcwingt
1. Iraded tc Creat Britain, in exchange tor base
rights in British American possessions, fifty obsolete
destroyers*
2. Repaired damaged firitisi warships in l . . I -
yards •
3* Attempted to excluc La submarines i'roa waters
contiguous ;aerican coasts*
4* Observed and reported movements of German naval
icrces I lied authorities*
5* i rovlded escorts to conveys containing American
and Hied ships*
ere was a gradual acceleration of aid as the
United States became more aware oi its danger and committed
itself more dee; -<ly. In this connection suet aid \ ad already
brought the United States into a form oi undeclared lli&iued
war wit' German naval forces by December 1941*
Police Action
• term police action implies a sanction oi society*
• purpose of which is tc protect that society by restrain*
in^ a possible oiiender cr subduing an actual oilender
against the laws oi the society* In international rela-
tions, the tact that police actions have irequently assumed
the characteristics oi limited war indicates Just low sXJ
pery is a clear distinction between the two* H e Korean
War, ait lice action in concept* was in tact a
full*grown limited war in its scope. U e land aspect* o

14
the Algerian insurrection had the attributes ol a limited
war; but the Irench employment of their navy to keep guns
irora being smuggled to the rebels was in eepin
.ice action concert.
there Is a modem trend towards associating
police actions with an act ot tie international community
in keeping with tie spirit, it not the word, otf tie Inited
Nations Charter, it should be remembered z) at traditional
ice actions have been carried c states against
iorces in their jurisdiction or sphere sf influence and
11
against violators of international law. A large portion
the operations I ritisl Navy between 1615 and 1914
were police actions such as the campaigns in Kgypt and the
suppression oi pirates and slavers.
Naval capabilities as a police power include:
(1) the landing and support ci ground forces, (2) some term
oi blockade, (3) punitive bombardment , (*) seizure oi ship-
ngt In recent years police actions have required naval
support primarily in landing and supporting ground iorces.
Although not carried out under Inited Nations auspices,
landing oi Inited States Marines in Lebanon during the sum*
mer oi 1$58 ieil in the police action category and appeared
1 2
to ba in keeping with the United stations Charter.
11
man B. setter, ''Legal s; ects oi the Eeirt.;.





it ion oi a naval blockade la a belligerent
13
and implies the existence oi a state oi war. How*
ever, s&v . as in the iorm ci a I irried cut by
rces oi the united Nations are not considered an act I
war.
1^ fcrt&ala m$ in ittftj a
action the security Council may take against duressors,
staves: 1ml action may include demons trations, bio
and other operations by air, sea or land lorcos oi Members
tie United Nations." Until now tt e Inited Rattens I as
inscituted only one blockade* In July 1950 a naval blockade
was imposed on the area held by the Government of Nor
Korea* With aited Nations enjoying undisputed cent,
oi §e*, tilt blockade was very effective, SlgaU Icantly,
a Communist China entered the Korean titer, no similar
blockade was proclaimed.
iacitic Blockade naa a means I rce short ox war,
[is] usually differentiated from wartime blockade by not
including traliic wi. a blockaded port by ships oi third
1 5
states, • • •* ~ au&h employed by major European powers
against states in Latin America and elsewhere during the
13
U..;,
., Congress, aenate, Joint Session oi \rmed
Services and foreign relations Committees, Hearings
t
inquiry
into llitary Situation in tl.e I ar uastT 62nd > , 1st
Sees., Part 3, p. 1512.
14 Ibid., 153-
.
15.hliliam i Bis , Jr., International Lav (Boston:
Little Brown, 1953), p. 56l.
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nineteenth century, tbe use t« sanction appears to be
obsolete.
Most blockades today are imposed by governmen ir-
assed by insur^err :es in areas under the nominal control
j$ovemment • -3se measures are rarely dlgniflftd ifith
tie vord "blockade at is w* at they arc)
since to do so would conier belligerent rights on the insur-
gents • Instead, &vrj subterfuge* ae "enforcement of customs
and trade laws" and "port closure" are used*
Common in preceding centuries, t act ice ftf puni-
tive bombardment of cities during peacetime is no
iqer sui. • nrted by world : inion or international lav.
I ton risal still takes ploea sionally dur;
revolutionary disturbances.
the seizure i reign vessels on v! at most nations
consider to be t!/ teas continues tc be a feature
international relations. V. ese occurrences are usually the
result ol dilferin? interpretations as to tie extent ci
territorial waters. ws9 under some circumstances this
reprisal cnncelva! i ox exert is-,
ssure in a situntlor different origin*
Military Damonstrat ion
In an analysis ol the security implications inherent






* Tl-e Law mid Custom of V. e .jea (3rd
ed.; New York: Frederick
~
~er, l c~5^}, > . J44.
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Military demonstrations could conveniently be class*
Li led according to objective under two major headings:
(a) those intended primarily to convey purpose or inten-
tion, and (b) those Intended primarily tc convey capa-
bility* The latter type is generally iree 01 the
iitieai risks which oiten attend the iormer.17
Lrodie would agree that only rarely are internions
separated ironi capabilities . Most demonstrations convey
liberal portions oi I . brodie's classification is useful
insofar as it shows the purpose and flexibility 01 tie dem-
aucraticn. To simplify examination oi this portion oi the
specLrum, em| hasis has been placed on tie conveyance
intention and purpose rather than oi capability; however,
the latter will not be ignored.
*or purposes oi this study demonstrations are cate-
gorized by their use as icilows: (i) threat or deterrent to
restrain or warn an opponent, (2) indication oi friendly
16
support lor an ally or neutrai. fccth or these categories
can also convey capability. The use oi the demonstration to
indicate iriendly support has been labeled "salutary pres-
ence'' and is discussed in the ioi lowing section as a dis-
tinct capability. In this section a military demonstration
is defined as the use of military iorces to threaten or
deter an opponent.
Writers lave given various names to demonstrations
17Bernard iirodls, "Military demonstrations «nd Dis-
closure or Kew Weapons, u world hclitics . v (\pril, 1V53),
IS
It is possible that a demonstration of supper
.
one country may be interpreted as e threat to another.

used as deterrents and threats. vain Garrison has called
19
t' cm ''orthodox preventive measures •" arles Murphy men-
tions the "cautioning gesture." In his incisive analysis
relations between modern nations, Hans MoTgeuthau dis-
21
cusses a "policy of prestige." Since much of Morgenthau's
analysis is pertinent to the subject oi this chapter,, parts
it will be quoted at length.
delating the policy oi prestige tc a nation's for-
eign policy, Morgenthau states:
atever the ultimate objectives ot a nation's foreign
policy, Its prestige—its reputation for power— is
always nn important and sometimes a decisive iactor
In determining the success or iaiiure oi its iorelgn
policy. A p prestige is therefore an indis-
pensable element oi a rational icrei.n policy.
Prestige has become particularly important as a poll?
-
ical weapon in an age in i e strti >r power
is icuui.t not only with the traditional methods i
political pressure and military force, but in large
measure as a struggle lor the minds of men. . . .22
Relating tie prestige policy to the military in gen-
eral and the navy in particular, he writes:
Besides tl-e practices oi diplomacy the policy o£
prestige uses military demonstration as a means to
achieve its purpose. Since military strength is an
obvious measure of a nation's power, its demonstration
serves to impress others with that nation 1 s power. • • .
Because of the mobility of navies > are
able to bring the ilag and power oi a nation to the
19
aial J. Carrison, "Tl the Navy in the
Cold war," USUI?. (June, 1V5V), 57.
arles J.V. hurphy, ";
Mix,'" Fortune
. H -ust, 195$, p. S3.
ent?-«iu, 75.
orgenthau, 75.
. I "l.L-. Sea iower: f7h« New
•

ur corners 01 the globe , end because oi tie greet
impressiveness oi their appearance, naval demonstrations
have in the pest been e tavorite instrument of a policy
prestige .23
^I'red Vagts elaboratin hortl ex has emphasised
tlexibility inherent in the navy as an instrument $n
policy.
For technical no less tl an ollticel reasons,
naval icrces lend themselves better t! an military [land]
„es to ti eposes oi a demonstration. i one
xtig, tKey are practically always more ready tor war
than land icrces and can set out at very si ort notice.
air movements can more readily be chem a
peaceiul to a hostile character--by diverse announce-
ments--and back again, Creel routine visits and "si owl
e flag" as a sign aslant readiness t I tect
national interests abroad to active interference wi
;s and landing iorces. Ti eir movements can be stopped
on short notice mid their meanings can be quickly re-
interpreted . . . . K» a rule, their action does not
seem to engage the dfumUntie r quite as deeply
irrevocably as a similar use oi military [land]
-ces. . • .2<*
/Vssessing tie current useiulness . e navy in su
ort ox toreign policy, lin Garrison maintains:
. silent tut Meaningful presence el naval icrces,
capable el employing eit) er conventional or nuclear
weapons, oi landing assault iorces and of remaining
indetinitely in the area as completely seli-£ lent
units las a remarkably stabilizing ei'iect in inter-
national aii airs. 25
Mevertl eless, as history amply records, a military
demonstration can become a police action tr even a limited
war under some circumstances, lie Battle oi Navarino in
23
Mcrgenthau, 72.
ise and__I . :





17 and Che Voterlean intervention in Vera Cruz in 19 in
but two examples 01 demonstrations tt at resulted in some*
ng much more serious*
Vagts points out that, to be demonstrative in cl ar-
acter, tie actions oi armed iorces must be clearly visible,
27pointing in a deiinite direction tor a deiinite purpose*
Beicre the development of radio communications, aircriJct and
missiles, a naval force to be effective as a threat or de-
terren en tc a position in very cl< s© proxin*
ity to the threatened p< in t
1S78 t*e British adHiral at. td is lieet in .
Mamora, C re, tc restrain .vussian armies until a
political settlement . II the I
ileet lad sailed around the ,egean instead, the Russians
might tave ignored its presence, ev .. m aware
28it. day suet, cl^se de . yaient is ue *sary My
be se, ting* j. Le threata«.ed i; I Sear .vast
or ' eia Minov during the V. : United ;>tate
fleet merely i '.traced in tie eastern Mttril rerreitffiin | its
I : seance was scui felt. en . . ts writes that
•tration must be "visible* to be ei I SMBi t! at in
the modern context tt reel tee demonstrating force
ts, 236-5"/, icr an extended ristori-..







and its purpose must be kmwt tc t wsr against wi ich it
is directed. The iorce need not actually te sighted by
J uman eyes, although this is irequently roost eliective.
i ress reports, electronic detection, and otter intelligence
are often adequate to convey information is re tie presence
of a naval iorce,
Brodie in Ms categorization, I 4 at the Ln-
nin - oi t! is section, mentioned a demonstration intended
primarily to convey ility. Host ese desnonsta-
tions carry dis ^rtones oi threat or Trent*
indicated in a previous chapter, the tran ar voyage i
iutilus could te considered in tl is category by I
Soviet leadership . ..-csides demonstrating the capability
£**• Nautilus this voyage demonstrated Lllty ox
Soviet Arctic coaats to penetration by new weapons syste*
ince a demonstration, particularly one used to con-
vey purpose or inter xcal overtones,
the nation employing it must be i :i to use those instru-
ments best suited to take adventa.. <. acterns
oi" the opponent* This requires adequate imagination and
intelligence concernii :sities of the enemy,
II e j ctential demonstration value will depend on
q intrinsic characteristics < a weapons or weapons
system in question, on itl tac --acy, and espe-
cially on ertinence ex that eilicacy to the entire
strategic situation as. appreciated by tie ...crson towards
e demonstration is aimed . 2Z
\Brodie, 299, Emphasis added*

tl
Land-oriented nations lave olten bean acutely aware
ot any tt reat to ti eir meritime irentiers—perhaps because
buiier states and a large number 01 army divisions are not
suitable ior their deiense.
Some writers "rave maintained chat demonstrations
.6 lose their Ltjr because el the nature ol the oinu-
eader . . criticism will be discussed and
evaluated in Chapter
utary Presence
lutary ,- resence is deiined i ere as the use ot
military lorces to impress or indicate iriendly support ior
a foreign power. It is usually an overt manifestation oj
diplomatic support, olten treated as a pa*t <- i; th* military
demonstration category , salutary presence diilers in degree
and somewhat in purpose from a military demonstration.
*radoxicalIy, salutary presence is more passive and
yet more positive than a threat or deterrent. The use i
force, while still implicit, Is not as menacing as it is in
a demonstration, another important distinction between the
demonstration and salutary presence is that in the latter
t\m amount or power (size and strength ;rc«s employed)
need not be as large as that required to bac: Up a tl reat
deterrent.
Tl e Russian cruiser Q*t dge was used ior the
Khrushci ev-Bulganln visit to Great Britain in 1956. By it-
sell this modern cruiser and its escort oi two destroyers
could not seriously menace the Britiel Isles. eir smart
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Closest to tie threat In the salutary presence
category is the use or. a tleet or even individual warships
to impress neutrals and potential enemies. "The periodical
dis , on the part 01 the great maritime r ewers,
naval squadrons to the ports 01 tie Far East demonstrated
to the people ol that region the superiority of iootoim
31lower ."
. the exercises and maneuvers carried out
jointly by allied powers usually have as their primary
objective increased military eiiiciency &nd tactical co-
ordination, oftea these operations are undertaken tor a
political purpose. He usual political purpose Is to indi-
cate iriendly support ci the allies tor one another and I
viability and solidarity oi the alliance. Insoiar as the
maneuvers have these objectives, cl ey are being used to
implement the salutary presence capability* t.uch operations
may. ci course, be used to impress neutrals or potential
enemies, or even as a military demonstration to deter or
threaten an opponent* Although less mobile and ilegible
in ti is respect, land norces can also be used to implement
salutary presence in some situations* Perhaps a classic ex-
ample is tie test's employment of its garrison In Berlin*
adlia
,
^wever, did ingress observers and
demonstrate Russian naval capabilities* It is interest!'
to speculate what the expect would have been I e Urdzi oni-
kldze had been escorted by two modern missile submarines in-





an In the course oi exercising tt e salutary
presence capability a warship or naval force puts into a
iriendly port, their stay is usually termed a "good will
visit*" Obviously , the use of the most modern and diver-
sified equipment is highly desirable in these visits to most
dramatically convey capability as well as intention.
\scuiaing that ports are to be visited, a condition
limiting tie tlexibiiity •£ this pax the spectrum is
that permission must be obtained diplomatically irrom the
host nation, trior to see in
-,
it is permission, lit-
ical eftects S visit on the host nation must be ascer-
32
tained by tea visitor insofar as possible* Lar?:e-scale
visits by naval iorccs i Western Powers to neutralist
states recently freed xrom colonial status Lave been very
limited since lv^i. As indicated previously, naval forces
in years past lave been the instrument of the leadir
nial powers.
The naval capability in the salutary presence cate-
gory is unique* h naval squadron, ©¥ even a single shi;
can on invitation -resent itself in a port without intruding
on the hospitality or the host by requiring barracks and
airiields or by i lying over his countryside* vn anchor*
is all that ±» necessary. tor a ~ew days U;« ships are
32
Incidents Have occurred where, after the host-
state has approved a visit, the visiting ships and liberty
parties have been made the object oi demonstrations carried
c by elements in opposition to the /jcverawent in power.
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gone; its stay was not long enough to wear out the welcome.
There were no "army of occupation' 5 complications; "nor does
their presence leave quite such a deep impression on the
Llective memory as military enterprise el a similar in-
tent—it seems to vanish like the trac.s till raw in the
33
water. *• Naval power is visible; but it is not imposed on
the countryside. It is adjacent to the state visited, but
34
not necessarily in or over it . This $ives the modern
navy a remarkable flexibility In implementing degrees of
"presence.
A collateral advantage that the local merchant
appreciates is that the liberty parties coming ashore are
usually well paid by local standards (and free spending by
any standard!). The people-to-people aspects of gee* will
visits are seldom ignored. Local charities are frequently
given considerable assistance.
.itlco-humanitarian * s&istance
Many would maintain that humanitarian assistance
hardly comes under the heading oi a power capability. Seat
would say that t\ e sole reason tor rendering humanitarian
assistance to another nation is altruism. Certainly, people
•^Vasts, 235.
The modern navy, toe, can exert power in and over
an adjacent land area t its air and marine components.
The display oi su. . -/er, however, is not tie sine qua non
el its presence. This is an option act available to armies
and land-based air iorces.
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everywhere are becoming more acutely aware ol conditions oi
luman tut faring in other parte oi the world, no matter wt at
the cause. By providing humanitarian and charitable support
a nation can demonstrate its genuine interest in the well-
being of other less fortunate nations* 'However, it cannot
be denied that there is at least a political by-rrcduct. Aid
this type is a manifestation ol enlist tened salt "interest.
er reciting a list ox humanitarian services rendered to
ctler nations by the U.S. Navy during the cold war, Captain
Carrison writes: "Missions ol this Kind support U.S. cold
35
war policies and promote international good-will."
Men's minds can be won by acts oi kindness or as-
sistance in spite oi: the real motives that may prompt sv-;
action. Tl e cold war has been and will be won and lost in
the minds ot roen. Tie purists may deplore this seemingly
"perverted altruism, but the tact remains that such assist-
ance is a means of exerting power, albeit an indirect one.
That this is so can be seen in the sometimes frantic race
the Soviet colonial empire and the free world run in trying
to render assistance to needy nations. Care Is usually
taken to see that such efforts are adequately publicised.
Clearly, this category can shade into (fee salutary
presence portion ox tie spectrum, or, Indeed, be identical
with it. More than one good will visit has blossomed into
extensive disaster assistance.
Carrison, 61. Lmphasis added.
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rmed iorces, in spite oi the requirements oi their
calling, have throughout modern history rendered various
humanitarian services whenever possible • Insofar as these
acts have von allies, gained the admiration oi neutrals or
won the respect ot enemies, they have been acts oi power.
The modern navy is well suited to carrying out the humani-
tarian mission. Its carabilities with power implications
include: relocation oi refugees, relief oi stricken areas
in case oi disaster—whether natural or man-made—and aid
to mariners in distress.
The relocation of refugees can be highly political
in its effects. This is a point on the Soviet colo-
nial empire is very sensitive. The evacuation of refugees
oia Horth Kcrea, together with United Nations iorces, in
late IS 50 was an act oi humanity because oi its political
overtones. t\ is evacuation dramatized the free choice of
the Korear le in casting their lot wit? the South Korean
and United Stations forces* In a similar manner the later
evacuation or. civilians from Kerch Viet Nam had well-publi-
cised cold war political implications* Such relocati
tasks are, to a great extent, made possible only by the
availability of adequate well-trained amphibious forces and
aea-lift capacity. Have] Iorces are usually the only ele-
ments equipped to execute this task rapidly on a truly lar
scale
•
^The Viet Kamese "Freedom Lift,* also called the

MIn relieving areas suffering from disaster, the
helicopter has made an outstanding contribution in reach.
37
sites formerly inaccessible to naval forces* The modern
navy's self-contained medical and rescue organization has
few eouals in taking disaster problems in hand.
Tte effect ot such assistance in building good will
and respect is difficult to assess. But usually the assist-
In- service receives praise in the local press and invar-
iably official expressions of gratitude are received throu
38diplomatic channels.
Humanitarian assistance, as a portion oi the power
spectrum, is c> , ortunlstic and can be followed as a delib-
erate policy only insofar as a state is constantly prepared
and equipred to render it. Imagination and initiative are
required for effective results. vi en used in this manner,
it has been a powerful weapon in the war for the mind of
man. The modern navy by virtue of its mobility, flexibility
and self-contained array of services has been admirably
suited icr this task.
"Passage to freedom, '* is described intra , pp. 71-73. It is
interesting to speculate on tie size of the airlift required
to duplicate this accomplishment. \s it was, ask was
completed by a relatively small U.S. amphibious force sv. -
plemented by MSTS vessels.
If
The Li «S • Nave's contribution to the relief of the
Tampico (SeLfember, 1955) and Ceylon (January, 1SSS) disas-
ters are informative in tl is respect.
38For a survey of letters oi thanks and official
statements ot gratitude, see: U.S., Department oi the Havy,
fice of Information, U.S. Navy Disaster kellef : bfiective-




From this trie! analysis oi Che spectrum oi naval
capabilities it is apparent tt at tie navy oi tl e cold war
era remains tt e handmaiden oi diplomacy and national policy.
The wide range and precise gradations of power which the
modern navy can exert have been useiul to the statesmen ol
free world who must meet a variety oi challenges and
take advantage oi diverse opportunities with tie most suit-
able instrument. Dm statesman serving a country with a
well-balanced modern navy enjoys a greater measure oi flexi-
bility in posing challenges to and meeting threats by his
less iortunate opponent.
Though important, the navy is only one oi Che in-
struments oi the statesman, while it can play a tine solo
in skilled ! ands, its greatest eflectiveness is realized
when it is skillfully co-ordinated with the other instru-
ments of the national policy "orchestra." It is the task
the statesman tc measure out the correct admixture fce
gain the etiect desired, lo achieve this etiect an under-
3&
standing oi the navy's capabilities is essential.
For one diplomat's views on the ca; a j.es and
political suitability oi naval forces, see Charles . ayer,
Diplomat (New York: harper & Bros., 193*), » 2, 4 (iavor-
able) and . 29-3') (critical).
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It Is not enough acittc Fleet be prepared to
prosecute all ;<ind£ ot limited wars or to continue to
protect tie peace by its deterrent powers. It is mag-
nificent force of officer*, men and equipment must make
significant contributions in blunting the diverse and
determined attacks • the Communists launei dailv
against the *ree World in this $ retracted conflict.!
11 is chapter deals with commitments in t *rm of
naval operations made by the United States in support oi its
ioreign policy in Southeast Asia in the years since tie end
of World war II. ut going into considerable opera-
tional detail an endeavor will be made to demonstrate the
manner in which the JJavy has f iayed its part in carrying out
American ioreign policy.
Bather than give a chronological resume oi these
commitments, the conceptual framework oi the previous oh* -
ter will be utilised. That is, operations with a similar
objective will be grouped together and described as integral
parts oi; the power spectrum, ibis approach will facilitate
the evaluation of the Navy»s contribution, which is the sub-
ject of Cre linal chapter of this study.
«M^—i—ii h i in p i» r i in we— m m i i ii— i m 11111111 iii.m.» — i —n *—, .!' i— t*—mmmmmu i i .» y — » ! m ipmimnw**.—..mwi. i w » ».'"" ' " ' i—iiinw*—^wwmmw
1
Letter from the commander* in -Chiei, U.S. ic
et, to all a lag and commanding officers, U.S. Pacific
Fleet, Subject: "The Pacific Float and the r."




No attempt will be made to describe M fei give a
complete record ot every c ion conducted by the Navy in
Southeast Asia waters since 1S<*5. Ihose operations that
will be included comprise a representative cross section ot
missions given to the I. . ftftifit ileet during the past
^en years*
id to Allies
Military assistance las been extended by the United
States to most of the states 01 Southeast Asia since the end
ol world War II. For the most part this assistance has been
given to tl ose states with wrier the United States fas col-
lective security treaties. Limited aid las been given u
few other states.
iteM.frtic^y,#ort
host oi tie aid given in Southeast Asia by the
United States has been in the iorm el lc istic support
t\ rou I Military Assistance ram (HAP). Inasmuch as
this study is concerned with naval operations, K\x aid will
not be discussed. 4' tH interest in tils section is the
2 is should net obscure the iact that such aid has
considerable influence tm vnoi part of the power spectrum
the statesman cheeses to employ. Dej uty Assistant Secre-
tary 01 Iteiense, Claries H. Shuff, testifyin
reign Aitairs Committee oi tie louse, stated:
Tor exaiai-le in u#moy ], . - . 3 roe vorlo
interests were ably deiendeo ortod loresa,
.eked by U.b. forces. WO vera given time, as t
situation became clearex, to see how muc roe was
needed, to arrange with oui allies tu apply that mu

72
logistic support rendered to the allies ol the limited States
ft roust the operations of tte iaciiic Fleet.
i two important occasions since the end oi World
War II elements oi the Pacific Fleet have been called upon
to exercise their logistic sup] ort capability in Southeast
Asia. The xirst was during the iamous 'Passage to Freedom"
xrom North Viet Nam alter the truce in Indo-China vale] was
concluded during tie summer ox Lt54« The objectives oi this
operation have been summarized by Kear admiral L.S. Satin,
tie onicer in tactical command*
A great many factors underlay the U.S. decision to
provide shippin t assist in che evacuation oi iiorth
It ^am in implementation oi t.,e Geneva Conference
Agreement ox 21 July 1954. These x actors, existlr;
•gainst a ba unci of almost certain inadequacy ox
available French shipping iormed the basis xor the de-
termination oi the mission of Task lorce 99 [the \raeri-
can torce conducting the evacuation] i ing deployed
in Indo-China waters and oi . riexly they may
be set down:
(1) 1 uiaanitarian desire ide transports-
tion icr those civilian residents oi foorth Viet Nam who
desired to live under the government uth Viet Nam
rather ti an the Viet Minn conquerors and wl o otherwise
might not be able to achieve K oal.
(2) The desire to prevent military equipment, most
:ant military equipment purchased through U. ;«
-ual Defense Assistance unds, from lalli
into the hands e Vie
(3) ile desire to demonstrate to the peopie the U.S.
determination to assist them in combatting and escaping
Communism wherever it appeared*
(4) The need to maintain close liaison with £ rerv
roe and no more. • • . :>ince the Issue could be de-
cided without recourse to more ioree than our allies
could deliver, the interests ox world security and peace
were best served."
U.S., Congress, House, Hearings Betore the Conmittee
on 5- oreIan Ax. iairs . 86th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1470."
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Viet Namese authorities in order to accomplish t
above aims.
3
By raid- 19 55 the evacuation I ad been completed.
American naval forces bad evacuated 310,8*6 e, 68,757
tons of supplies and 8,135 vehicles. The American iorce
acccrajllsbini? this sizeable task was small but obviously
eiiective. It was comprised i> a most part of aiuf us
elements regularly deployed in The
tret r.~carryin telty ell-suited them to
the task oir r> evacuation. The humanitarian :ti oi
this operation were many, as Is app&ren? | ron drairal Satin%
letter. 1'hese aspects will be discussed iurther in a subse-
quent section.
vd occasion calling lor the exercise oi this
capability was the Tachen crieis of February 1^55. Uter
the Communist C! ineae capture ol tre small island ef Yiki-
gshan in the Tachen Group, increase. mmlat pressure
made Becei B Nationalist vl inder
ot ti e islands in tha trewp. Because of the location i
"better irom the Commander I ilious Croup One




,-re is some basis for the belie t that the islands
'e Bui tatei bad been
to commit its forces to thai* defense* lac! ens were
closer oanmist Dsitisns t uaaoy
s day i eld by Nationalist iorces. However, President
Eisenhower decided that tie islands were net vi, e
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the islands off the coast ai CVekian* Province, some two
hundred mixes from Taiwan and literally under Communist
.,uns, the troop-litt capacity dl the Nationalist Navy was
both insuiticient in size and inadequately protected I
enact the wit) drawal without unacceptable losses*
resident Elsenhower made t>e decision to assist the
Nationalist Government in withdrawing its iorces from the
islands* As a result, strong American naval iorces were
7
assembled in tie seas north oi Taiwan. e American am-
uious iorces assisting in t> e Viet Namese "Freedom Lift"
were temporarily deployed northward to assist ot* er units
Iin the evacuation. Covered by the biggest concentration
of American naval power since the Inchon landing in IS50.
United States and Chinese Nationalist ships ferried t
garrison, together with the entire civil population o.
o
islands, to Taiwan.' In all 28,500 persons and 40,000 tons
1C
oi military equipment were evacuated.
deiense oi Taiwan. Without American assistance the islands
were untenable and the Chinese government on Taiwan decided





In all some 132 American and 27 Nationalist war-
ships participated in the evacuation. This force included
a U.S. covering unit of 5 attack carriers, 6 cruisers, and
50 destroyers* Haw Yor*i Times . February 13, 1V55, p« 3, and
U.S. flews .>rld kerort , February 4, 1V55, p« 23.
8Time . February 21, 1S55, ; . 3.
•w York Tiroes - I - raary 13, 1^55, p. I ...
10 id
.
, ; . 3.
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While tie Dumber ct personnel evacuated ircra the
lachens was inslgnii leant wi en measured against the quanti-
tative accomplishments ot the "Freedom Liit," the former
operation was carried out under more demanding conditions*
In the Xachens there was the constant risk oi armed Commu-
nist interierence; indeed, one American aircratt strayed c
course and was shot down by Communist anti-aircrait batter-
ies* In many respects the Tachen evacuation was similar to
ungnam redeployment oi t jrean War* In both cases
amphibious iorces worked under combat conditions while cov-
ered by a powerful escort*
;ratlonal Sui^ort
Information on this subject remains cia*;»iiied ior
the nost part and any exposition will necessarily be based
heavily on implication and surmise* however, one concrete
example o±. such support was the escort provided by elements
the Seventl rieet to Nationalist vessels supply uemoy
durin 58 crisis* On that occasion American escorts
convoyed Nationalist supply vessels to within three miles
11
the besieged islands*
American na^al patrol aircrait have long conducted
surveillance flights a' he Chinese coast, outside the
12twelve mile limit. It apy.eare certain that the United
1 ..— , . -y
~n -ti * 1— -riwrii r- ii . i niimiii i ir i*« i ri r r i mm i—wn r i n r -i n.n n >i r i . iw n i i*i »h**j« -- i im i . rtn rnr - - * r-~ -.—-—
11U.S. News and World Report, ember 19, 1958,
pp* 31-32.""
Tr e United States does not rt a Communist
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ites has shared souie, If not all, c£ this operational
Intelligence with the Nationalist Navy on an exchange
basis. 13
Before leaving the subject of aid to allies, it
would be well to point out. that the mere presence of Ameri-
can naval rorces in tl e vicinity of Taiwan has been to some
extent operational support insofar as it has inhibited any
Communist attempts at invasion ot Nationalist-held islands.
This subject will be discussed more fully when military
demonstrations are examined,
Klice Actions
No claarly defined police actions on tie order
the Korean war, cr even ct the Lebanon landings, have been
undertaken by the United States in Southeast Aaia since
end oi .Grid War II. Cue operation that might be put In
this category was the Hainan incident ci July 26, 1954, in
whici two Chinese Communist aircraft were shot down while
Bloc's delimitation of territorial waters at twelve miles.
Apparently the flights lave been conducted at a minimum dis-
tance of twelve miles to minimize any alleged "provocation.
her the importance attached to the twelve mile line oft the
Chinese coast M American tactical commander, see:
Burdick I . «.rittin, International Law lor Seaaoir. Jeers
(\nnapolis: U.S. Naval Ins t itute , 1 9 56 ) , j, . 5v .
,\dmiral telix B. btump's (Commander in Chief,
Pacific >rea) answer to a reporter's question is revealing
r what is not said on this subject.
usstion: "I& there anything to th.e Communist
charge that American aircraft spot si ips reading tor Commu-
nist ports tor the beneitt oi tie Chinese Nationalists?"MMVI f,Ue conduct patrols over seas o;. the ocean
in wh id we have an interest
.
L.^. News and ^orld deport . August 27, 195h, p. 24.

77
attacking American aircrait* The American aircrait were
entered in a searc survivors ^ rom a British airliner
slot down by the Chinese Communists three days previously*
However, this operation was in the nature 01 humanitarian
assistance and the police action required was incidental
15
the accomplishment oi the task given ti-e search iorce*
xiitary Demonstrations
ince the xJeaaraunist triumph in China, military dem-
onstrations, as defined in Chapter 111, by United States
naval iorces have been an integral part of t* e international
scene in Southeast \sia* several of these operations will
be described in the following sub-sections*
Indo-eiina
During the siege el Dlenbleni hu in April 195^, an
\raerican naval force carried out a demonstration oil the
coast ol Indo-China.
"• • . 'Iwo U*S* aircrait carriers, the j>oxer and rhllis- -
. ne Sea , steamed towards the South. China Sea irom the
hilippines* ... it was the classic show cf force,
designed both to deter any Red Chinese a-
Nam and to provide weapons lor instant retaliation
should it prove necessary*" 16
l4Brittln, 50.
^4ote that American naval forces were still oper-
ating in waters adjacent to Indo-China during tie wee* alter
the Geneva Conierence*
16James Shepley, 'How Dulles Averted War, 1 ' Lire ,
January 16, 1*56, p. 71*
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One observer maintained that the United States was consider-
ing the possibility ot intervening in the Indo-China con-
flict and that the naval forces were moved Into position
be ready to implement such a decision. ' The possibility
intervention is, of course, explicit in a demonstration.
IS
Such intervention was never undertaken by American forces.
Later on June 27, IS 54, during the Geneva Conference
on in, - inese problems the force returned tc the waters
adjacent tc northern Indo-China. As previously noted, this
force was still in those waters on July 26th, almost a m
aiter £ha end oi the conference. Both or these deployments
...oerican naval forces were officially considered "pari
normal &avy precautions in an emergency that could aiiect
If
. . interests. :l
| liwan
In several respects President Truman's neutraliza-
tion of Taiwan on June 27, 1950, was a continuing military
demonstration. The explicit executor of this decision was
17
C! aimers M. Roberta, "The Day We 0idn f t Go to
War," . rter, September 14, 1954, pp« 31-34.
18Alle?.ed)y, the U.S. Joint
Allied, principally British,, support the sine qua non of
intervention. The Britisi mcient alle^edly deci ined
to suivort such action. Ibid .
U.S. hewe and World r;ey-Grt . August 6, 1954, p« 23.
This is a ,;ood i.Llustration oi 'va^ts* statement that naval
movements can 'readily be changed
'
trcm a peaces ul to a
. character—Ly diverse announcements--and back a^ain,
• . . Their movements can be stopped on short notice and
^ir meanings can be quickly reinterpreted. ts, 235.
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tie Seventh Fleet. In practice, this mission required the
interposition ct |f«S« naval tcrces between iaiwan and the
mainland o Laa. ugh the Chinese Communists tad
started to mount an invasion before the deployment el eie-
meats oi the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Strait, signifi-
cantly none was attempted alterwards.
IV e Fleet's mission underwent a iundamental modifi-
cation in tebruary 1933 when President Eisenhower "issued
instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed
to shield Coraraunlst China. * The other half ol I resident
Truman's directive to the Seventh Fleet—to prevent any
attack on Taiwan—was retained by I resident Eisenhower. In
essence the Fleet was used to insure a sheltered sanctuary
(lor Nationalist opera tlens against the mainland) similar
to that enjoyed by the Communists in Maaclurla during tie
Korean War.
From late June 1950 until the autumn oi 1954 Ameri-
can naval strength in the Strait was very modest. It usu-
ally consisted oi a destroyer division, a seaplane tender,
In early 1950, aiter their invasion of Hainan, the
Chinese Communists massed their torces on the coasts oi
klen and Chekian- rovinces allegedly icr the invasion
Taiwan. It is estimated that as many as 10 Jese
troops contracted an incapacitating disease caused by a
blood fluke which was invested during amp-l ibious exercises.
Tie problems induced by an epidemic oi suet magnitude alleg-
edly frustrated Communist eiiorts to mount an Invasion i
Taiwan, frank A. merman, Jr. , 'The blood Fluke That Saved
Formosa, " parperg . ,\pril, 1959, pp. 45-47, and Harold
hinton, "cl ina , " Major Governments ol Asia . ed. George H.
Kahin (Ithaca: Cornell University tress, 1958) » p. 56.
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and a squadron cr two ci naval patrol aircraft. These units
iormed a surveillance net that could be reiniorced rapidly
by other elements ot the Seventh Fleet.
In U«e winter oi 1954-55, during tie Tacben evacua-
tion, this iorce was greatly augmented by the striking power
several task groups, including iaaous Task Force Seventy-
seven composed oi attack carriers and their escorts. In
spite of poor weather conditions existing then, many Ameri-
can naval units participating in the operation were clearly
visible from Communist gun positions. CMnese Communist
iorces made no attempt to intertere with tie evacuation.
A subsequent crisis occurred during the summer oi
1958 when It appeared that helping might attempt tc take
advantage oi the world's pre-occupation with the Lebanon
landing to gobble up the oil si ore islands oi Quemoy and
21
Mateu. The Davy's participation in the Lebanon landings
is well known. Shortly alter the Navy had exercised its
police action capability in the Levant, it was called upon
to use its demonstration capability In the Far Ease, lie
tacit ic Fleet was rapidly put on a war-ciiae iuvtin^ and a
22
major portion of it was assembled in the Formosa b trait.
21
The best description oi the Navy»s participation
in the Quemoy "showdown" Is contained in Charles Murphy f «
"U.S. Sea Power: »Xhe hew Mix,*" fortune , xugust, 1959,
pp. 83, 1&0-87. Much oi the inicrraation in this article
is not available from any other non-classified source.
22American naval forces eventually included some




As Indicated previously in this chapter American
naval lorces escorted Nationalist Chinese vessels to witMn
three miles ox. ' ueiaoy. The most valuable contribution i
the Navy, however, was the great strength and proximity
the fast carrier strike forces. Although subjecting the
islands to heavy bombardment, the Chinese Communists did not
attempt to conduct an invasion nor directly attack United
States icrces.
had endeavored to capitalize en the Ameri-
can ccanaltscent in the Mediterranean by subjecting a we-
point in the containment barrier tc great military and
23itical pressure. \\ r arently the Chinese Comirunists
telt that pressure on such a ,-reat scale would result in
another lac; en-like retreat, in this they were disappointed,
sea power had given tl Lnited States the option m to where
to withdraw and where to stand iirm.
while, demonstrating its purpose and intention oi
ueraoy, the b.S. Wavy also demonstrated its capability to
the Chinese Communists.
II ere was a ;ood deal ol astute gamesmanship in the
manner in which b.S. power was manipulated so as to make
its wei newn tc the adversary, yet not prov< im
into a clash. U.. .
, Oiicy w-as to let Chiang carry the
battle. . • • with the idea of apprising the Keds
23The political pressure came both irom Communist
China and the Soviet Union, Further, the allies of the
United States were extremely reluctant about bei 1 aced in
a position in w* i; aid be committed to deiend the
offshore islands 11 the Chinese Communists attacked them.
Drew Middleton, "China id icy: Seen by Our -\llies, ; ' Mew
York limes . September 14, 1958, Sec. IV, p. 5.
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that raucl-' better equipment was being held back, Beakley
[Commander of the Seventh fleet operating ot'i Taiwan]
kept his iastest fighters . . • flashing over the
Straits, at an altitude w* ere they were certain
register a thought -provokinc; impression en Kad radar
screens
.
net er method used to convey capability was the
equij>| lag ( lang's obsolescent lighters with the deadly
Navy-developed "sidewinder' missile ; this missile gave the
superb Nationalist pilots an edge over their otherwise
better-equipped adversaries*
Salutary Presence
In the tlrst tm* years icl lowing World War II Ameri-
can naval power receded irom Southeast ssia. U.5* naval
forces in the Far East were concentrated primarily in Japa-
nese home waters and in North China, Appearances ty Ameri-
can warships in Southeast A.sia were on a limited scale and
were confined to a few >ocd will visits and special diplo-
matic missions* These appearances are classified as salu-
tary presence inasmuch as they were carried out in order to
indicate United States support oi the countries ox the area*
A successful example of such presence was the visit
a six ship tas oe, including a cruiser and a carrier,
to the Philippines in July o£ 1947 in connection with the
25first anniversary of ihiiippine Independence Day.
*Sfcurpfey # 18**.
, ., Department oi the Navy, Annual Report oi |
Secretary oi toe »avy* 1948, p« 8*
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somewhat similar mission to indo -China was less satlsiactoryl
In March 1950 two American destroyers steamed into Saigon to
indicate American support oi tie hrenci -backed bao Dai re-
26
ie» ^ result was a well -organized riot in the streets
oi the city led by Viet Hinh elements and their adherents.
A more unusual mission was that given Renville, an
attack transport vessel, during the winter oi 19^7-^6, In
co-operation wit? the United ft at ions, the United States tur-
nished this vessel to act as neutral "ground" in the harbor
oi Batavia (now Djakarta) tor the L.K. tact-iinders Investi-
27gating the Indonesian insurrection.
Wit! the tall ol CI ina to the Communists, the start
of the Korean War, and the neutralization oi the tormosa
Strait oy residential Order, American naval power began to
reappear in strength in Southeast Asian waters. ~ the
end oi tha korean War, the locus oi American naval opera-
tions stilted southward to an even greater degree, the
ports c. H»fti allies were visited irequently. They included
23
Bangkok, Manila, Singapore, Hong
, ChllUBg and Saigon.
With few exceptions the \ orts oi the newly independent,
and in the ra*in politically uncommitted, nations were not
Ellen J. Hammer, il c Conflict in Indo-Ct. ina (Stan*
ford Lniv. <ress, 1^5-0, p. "2"7lV
l




* John V. Noel, "S> owing the Flag in aast
Asia." U&til.: '. 1 (February , 1955), 17?- .

Hvisited* The calls oi American vessels in Ceylon in 1958
and India and Burma in itJf seemed to presage more frequent
visits to the uncommitted nations oi Southeast \sia in the
years tc come*
Although the Southeast Asia Collective jjeien.se
aaty was ratified in tbmai'P 1*55, the tirst joint maneu-
vers oi tie iorce* oi the signatory states were not held
until March 1956. 11 is operation, called ulirmiink," was
to be the forerunner oi many others; several exercises were
held annually in succeeding years, in these joint opera-
tions naval co-ordination was usually the chief military
objective.
The substantial American contribution to these exer-
cises tended to emphasize the American commitment to sup] or
t
its allies in Southeast Asia. Western, and specifically
American, presence in Southeast Asia has been the subject
considerable criticise I the uncommitted nations in and




Since 1945 the Li.o. Aavy has rendered a considerable
amount of humanitarian assistance in the far cast, much
it in Southeast Asia. The most spectacular example oi suci
aid was the "Passage to I reedom" in Viet Ham previously
described. :s operation combined aid to an ally with
humanitarian assistance. Tie humanitarian and political

ectives oi the "1 assage to Freedom" ara obvious in
29
Admiral Satin's letter, previously quoted. oper
received wide publicity throughout the nc: :iuniat world.
u-h not occurring in Southeast Asia proper,
assistance rendered to Ceylon by American L torces dur-
ing January 1558 was widely covered by tie i tess oi Soul -
3o
east Asia* on this occasion a U«<« aircratt carrier and
two destroyers, leaded with helicopters, iood and medical
supplies, made a last voyage from Manila to ilood-stricken
31
and disease-threatened Ceylon. The Governor General oi
Ceylon, Sir Oliver te the American amoas-
Jeylon and E ate deeply grateiui to
your Government, Admiral Brlggs [tie \merican ollicer
ccuuaanain^ tie tat ietlng the assistance],
yourself and all others oi your country who so readily
came to our assistance in our Etna were
amazed at the^ speed and eiiiciency with wlicS the aid
was rendered. 32
\ iar&e toctieo of >sia de^-fe-nds on the sea
directly ior its livelihood. I are til 1
sea indirectly since maritime transport provides the only
2 *Supra , ppt 72-73.
il .b. Navy disaster ^eliet, pp. 8-12.
31
• Llward i. isaidridfce. . itico-hilitary iolicy in
Today's &avy, i: l^*. , LXXXV (March, 1959), 31-35. XI is
article presents a lucid descrlpti< the policy consider-
ations involved in rendering humanitarian assistance. The
operation in Ceylon, brieily described here, was used as a
case study*
32




access to markets. The rrequent tropical storms and the
small size ot the vessels used in commerce and listing in
the region combine to make nautical mist aps and disasters
a irequent occurrence* As a result ot its widespread de-
ployment throughout fcast \sia the U.S. Navy has been often
33iirst on the scene to render aid.
There are many other examples 01 the types oi ruman«
itarian assistance given by the Navy in Southeast \sian
waters since if4f« Ihe search ior survivors of a British
airliner shot down by Chinese Communist aircraft has been
described previously, Another example occurred alter the
war in late 1945 and early 1946 when American naval ampl ib-
ious craft carried .lea to outlying Islands in the
3 *
.lippines and brought their copra to market.
Conclusion
East Asia since 1945 has been the setting of the
sharpest clashes between the tree world and the Soviet colo-
nial empire. Because it is, perhaps, the principal battle-
ground on whlct the cold war has been and is being fought*
and because of its geography and political dynamism,
oast Asia represents a decisive area in which to evaluate
the utility oi the naval power spectrum in the contemporary
Tl« . DopOTtMMkt Of the Movy. Off100 . :.uorma-













EVALUATION CF THE NAVY'S CONTRIBUTION
• . • The ability of the U.S. and the Western nations in
general to command and use the sea routes will at once
appear as a great asset—but like most assets of value
cnly if it can be invested in conjunction with others—
and in accordance with some well dexlned purpose.!
In till chapter an endeavor will be made to synthe-
size the elements o£ the previous three chapters in order to
arrive at an evaluation oi the Navy f s role in U.b. U reign
icy in Southeast Asia since 1945. XI e components pre-
sented in the previous chapters have been objectives , capa -
bilities and commitments respectively* As indicated in
Chapter I, the central purpose oi this study is to evaluate
naval commitments supporting iorelgn policy objectives
against a yardstick 01 naval capabilities* Beiore under-
taking this task these components, wile! were deiined in
Chapter I, should be related to one another.
The ^relationship of Objectives .
Capabilities and Commitments
Adairal Robert Carney, while Chiei oi hsval Opera-
tions, wrote: "Ii one were to risk an all-inclusive defini-
tion oi national policy, it might be said that it represents
i
Walter Mill is, *Sea lower: \bstractlon or Asset?"
foreiK-n Stairs. XXU (April, 1951). 375.
86

Mthe sum-total oi national aspirations balanced against
2
national capabilities. ° When put in operational torra,
aspirations become objectives. To be realistic the commit
-
aents undertaken by a state oust strike a balance between
these objectives and the means available to realize them.
\dAlral isur.ce, Admiral Carney's successor as Chief oi Naval
Operations, put it this way:
kelat ionshir s t e tween lore I -.-.u ; ol icy ob lect ives and
military capabilities are inset, arable * frorei^n
:
olicy
considerations sometimes prevent military leaders from
carrying out a strategic plan they think is most appro-
priate* Bui conversely, il the military lacks certain
capabilities—it it is not able to provide just the
right degree oi lores at the right time~-then the makers
of foreign policy are seriously hampered in their I
torts as well .3
£ alike Gross makes the same point when he writes:
"It is rather easy to design objectives of foreign policy;
it is, however, difficult to enforce policies. The latter
4
requires material and immaterial tactors. 1' Capabilities,
then, are the limiting factors in the iemulation of real-
istic objectives.
Commitments, as elements oi policy, are undertaken
to realize objectives. They are inclusive of capabilities
inasmuch as a meanin.-Lul commitment cannot normally exceed
2
**Kobert B. Carney, "The I rinciples oi Sea lower,
qfr. LXXIX (August, 1953), 818.
3
C3SU Shop Talk: h rersonal Message to All U.
Naval Qliricers , November 9. 1^5V«
4~Gross, 94.

Ha capability. On tie other t and, a commitment Is signi
cantly related to the objective* TI e size of the commitment
is adjusted to reflect tr e importance ol an objective and
the relative difficulty in achieving it. • commitment,
then, is limited by maximum capability and by the nature 01
ti e objective*
At this point it should be said that the objective
by its very nature may lie beyond tie capability of any one
instrument of national power; no realistic commitment of any
one instrument may be sufficient to achieve the objective*
However* a combination of commitments by the various instru-
ments of national power may place the objective within the
realm of national capability. ict that such a mixture
is often necessary in the pursuit of foreign policy objec-
tives sreatly increases the difficulty of evaluating tie
techniques of foreign policy. Insofar as possible in the
evaluations attempted in this chapter* an effort has been
made to separate those results for which tie Navy is pri-
marily responsible from those achieved principally by other
instruments of national power*
Naval tower and Containment
iXiring the fifteen years covered by this study the
5
A. commitment cannot usefully be employed as a bluii
although a specific maneuver to carry out a commitment may




United states was the world's leading naval power* Anything
within the capabilities oi modern naval forces could have
been accomplished by the United States. Naval capabilities
were seldom tully exploited because other considerations,
usually political, were dominant, lor example* during the
Korean War the United States had the capability to conduct a
naval blockade oi Communist China. This capability was not
exercised because oi the opposition oi the U.K. allies ci
7
the United states. us any evaluation ci the naval con-
tribution* or possible contribution, to the execution oi
American ioreign policy must be carried out within the
larger political rrame oi reference.
Although sometimes obscured by references to "roll-
back" or "liberation," the primary American security objec-
tive since l$47 has been tie containment at the Soviet
colonial empire. Until MMK) no determined eiiort was made
to implement this objective in Southeast \sia. In the imme-
diate post-war years American naval power in Asian waters
was smaller in some respects than it had been in pre-war
days when tie U.S. Asiatic Fleet operated irom Cavite and
Olcngojc in the H>ilip{.ines. With the iall oi China to the
Communists in 1949 and the Korean ar which broke out the
to 11owing year the United States was iorced to implement
its containment policy in Asia in tact as well as in theory.
rr - • "- -riv" '—-— , i , - i urn t i m . j i n iiiimr ' I ti -- ! i . j---iuii i m »m i r.i w - imun »m inuiiuji wu nww .. ii.ii.i~' i i




Subsequent to 1950 whenever a state in Asia chose to
remain independent, it did so because its rriends controlled
tie adjacent seas and demonstrated a will intioss to coma to
its aid ii that independence were threatened. However, il
a people were deluded by an indigenous leaders I controlled
by a iorei.c,n state, American naval power could do little to
remedy the situation wit* out doin* violence to American
principles. case in point occurred in Indo-China in 1954.
In Indc-U ina the democratic elements wore cam'
between Communism and colonialism, lie people had experi-
enced colonialism wMle Coramuniem had become identiiied with
independence, lie people ci North Viet Nam chose, or at
least accepted, a new indigenous leadership and rejected
the old eolo&ial status (no matter hew modernized and re-
ioisied). lie possibility that many oi the new leaders
were the tools oi a iorei^n power was either immaterial,
unknown, of discovered :ate.
Under these circumstances American naval power was
powerless to save the Viet Mini- infested northern - art
Indo-China from Communist seizure. The value of the \meri-
S
can naval demonstrations in 1954 is problematical. Whather
a strii-e by carrier-based aviation would have saved Dien-
bien/ 5 u must remain an unanswered question, but, this m
seems sure: such a strike in support of French iorces
would !,wi -ared to si&ns everywhere as an attempt
I




on the part oi the United States to re-impose a colonial
regime on a people lighting ior their independence, i rob-
ably, in the long run, American objectives in Indo-Clina
were best served by not utilizing maximum naval capabilities
to attempt to retrieve a poor military and a worse political
situation*
Containment, to be etfective in Southeast \sia, has
required that the people of the region have a; Imately
the same lmaae oi ultimate Communist intentions as do those
states that by experience are more familiar with the Commu-
nist threat. 11 is means that the United states las lad to
seize every opportunity to shew the true nature and ultimate
intentions oi Communism to the peoples o£ Southeast sia.
Attitudes 1 awards &ea r'ower in Southeast Asia
Any evaluation e eiiectiveness o£ naval power
in a given area must consider the attitudes oi its inhabit-
ants towards sea power* Ihls is particularly important
under conditions of cold war when the psychological signifi-
cance oi modern weapons and their employment is very great*
A careiul look at the geography oi Southeast Asia
explains better than any words the importance oi sea power
in contrail ins; such an area. The only vital transportation
medium is shipping. Without it, or denied its use, t
economy oi the region would $rind to a halt and many of
its people would tace lamina. Lven the mainland areas
are, In t, islands since there are lew slgnil leant

Ninternational land transport routes, I roLessor Buss writes
. east vsia:
I continental countries are separated jirem the rest of
\sia by raa ;ni icent Mountain barriers, and their inter-
nal communications are ol'ten d t because 01 jun-
gles , malarial swamps, or rugged peaks. where the lands
divide, tie seas unite. Every type oi ship—froa the
ib sails and tie Ct inese junks to modern luxury liners
—ply irora port ts pert .
The Japanese conquest el Southeast <.sia in World War
II was made possible only by their control of the seas* Al-
lied naval iroces were their primary target the iirst
minute oi the war—at Pearl Harbor in 19*»1—until the last
gasp o£ the hamikazl attacks—o inawa in 1145 . only
after the Allied naval forces tad been destroyed, dispersed,
or neutralized could the Japanese conduct their invasion of
utheast Asia and maintain their control thereafter * \s
Japanese naval power crumbled subsequent to the summer
p Japan's grasp on Southeast Asia withered* This lesson
has not been lost on Asians*
Memories are Ion;; in the Far East* ] ians well
remember World War II. They remember that their coun-
tries were lost to the enemy* They remember too that
lr countries were redeemed, via the sea*
These people understand the vital nature ol sea
power. It is not just the rulers or the leaders that
do; it is the man in the street, the business man, and
the coolie.
Very tew o£ them know theory, but they know this:
when tie seas around them are controlled by themselves
one their irlends, their countries live in hon r. en
the seas around them are controlled by enemies, their
nations Call and fchty are run by a forei ,,wer*
It is as simv le as that, and they understand it




well, 'ihey understand it because they learned it t
bard way, the very hard way* Ik
The "long memories/ 1 t eh Admiral Burke referred,
are also aware c.f the fact that Western sea power had pene-
trated the region and set up empires and spheres of Influ-
ence long before the Japanese had arrived on the scene
duri: arid War II* China and Southeast Asia were contin-
uously victimized by Western sea \ ower until well into the
twentieth century*
From the joint of view of nationalists in contem-
porary Asia* the waters surrounding them have been held by
"iriendly powers* only toe rarely. The seas did bring the
invader; but during the past 400 years the invader has been
the West, utile there Is a growing awareness among free
Asians of the importance of American control ci the seas to
their independence* cognizance should be taken of the
Asian's traditional distrust of western sea-borne power.
Sea power, and specifically naval power, has been in years
past the handmaiden or Imperialism* Ills association of
navies with imperialism is doubly unfortunate today when
the chie reat to the independence c ^heast sian
countries comes from a land power* The naval power of the
iree world, in attempting to bolster a vulnerable area, has
been saddled with the albatross el an unfortunate past.
Happily, the very flexibility of naval power gives
tors
I ft
Admiral Burke, speaking before the Newspaper Edi-
Luacheun, Minneapolis, Minnesota, July 18, till .

its possessors a way in wl id to moderate the rigors 01 this
dilemma. Navel power, the mailed list and velvet glove of
see power, can exert its pressures in sud ways as to keep
t sensitive nationalist's distrust at a minimum while
achieving the objective rustrating the will of the a -
gressor* No method presently available can both accomplish
3 objective and completely eliminate the rabid national-
ist's distrust* The unique flexibility possessed by the
Navy gives the United States significant advantages in its
efforts to defend Southeast \sla from Communist military
aggression* Ic a lesser extent: the Navy also gives the
United States some measure of flexibility in dealing wit
Communist political* i.e. subversive* encroachment.
valuation 01 the &aval tower Sieeirma
There are two possible criteria by n one might
measure the "success" of a technique ci loreian policy.
The first is to compare the actual results with the
actives that were initially stipulated; failure to
reach a charted goal would thus mean that the technique
oved unsuccessful. Cn the other hand* one may measure
the difference between the overall policy situation at
the moment the technique is invoked and the situation
afterward* II the state's position, on balance* is
im. d (and the improvement is due to the new tec -
niquej. it is possible to claim success.**
In the evaluation to follow, the latter criterion
has been employed where possible. lM . tion of the power
1 1
Charles 0. Lerche, Jr*, "The United States, Great
Britain, and 6 : A Case i>tudy in Fait aecompli," Jcumd
yo. . viitlcs , LVIII 8t, 1956), k

97
spectrum will be examined In turn. Evaluation will be
limited to those operations described in Chapter IV*
\ld :: Uies
e twin objectives oi all American military assist-
ance to states in Southeast Asia have been to help them
defend themselves against aggression and tc help them man
eir portion of the free world f s defense perimeter. Tie
former objective has been explicit while the latter has been
Implicit, Often the two have been identical. Most of this
aid has been administered tl the Military Assistance
,ram; in some instances it has been rendered through the
operating forces of the U.S. Havy. Suet assistance has
normally been limited to those tasks beyond the capability
of the allied navies concerned.
The "Passage tc Freedom" in Viet Nam and the evacua-
tion oi the Tachens were outstanding examples oi the Navy's
logistic support capabillties. Both were tactically suc-
cessful. From the military standpoint bott operations
helped an ally preserve the integrity of his military
forces 5 equipment and personnel were removed that otherwise
12
would have fallen into enemy hands. Both operations were
retreats undertaken on the basis of both political and mili-
tary considerations. Once the decision was made tc retreat,
I
'•
in the evacuation of North Viet Sam the vast ma-
jority of the personnel transported by American naval xorces
wore civilian refugees. In the Tachens most oi the evacuees
wore military personnel.

Nthe Navy's transport capability made it possible to retrieve
some advantage from unfavorable political and military
situations*
When measured a ainst the objective of containment,
the "freedom Lift* and the lad -en evacuation must be classi-
fied as calculated strategic retreats to within the contain-
ment barrier as it was further defined by American statesmen.
Ultimate definition of tie barrier is, cl course, determined
by military and political realities.
! e Tachen operation combined elements of aiding an
ally, a military demonstration, and politico-humanitarian
assistance. n tte basis of events which have occurred
since 1955, the Tachens clearly could have been held II they
had been supported to the degree that the United States has
since supported the Nationalist troops on Quemoy and Matsu*
To have supported the Tachens in this manner would have re-
quired considerable American military assistance on a con-
tinuing basis. He political disadvantages of maintain!.
Nationalist forces on the islands (clearly not vital to the
delense of Taiwan) and the required magnitude of the mili-
tary investment dissuaded Washington from supporting the
Nationalist government in its efforts to hold the islands.
In this situation political considerations ruled against
the employment ol the Navy's lull assistance capability.
Instead the Navy was made the primary executor of the deci-
sion to withdraw.

Herational support of Allied naval forces In
x least Asia has been very limited and that given has
been tailored to fit a lew very sensitive situations*
reason for this limited use Is that operational support, as
Indicated In Charter III, comes very close tc limited war.
As a result, commitments involving operational support are
closely controlled. A case in point is the very close
j-rvision exercised by the Commander of the Seventh fleet
over American warships escorting Nationalist vessels to
13besieged Quemoy. Because of the security classification
given to most operations el this nature, a meanin-.iul eval-
uation of t? eir ^tiveness is not possible. Suffice it
to siy that up until the end of 1959 none of these opera-
as bad -iven rise to anything more than scattered clashes
between \merican and Communist iorces.
ho lice Act ion
Except for the Hainan incident described in Chapter
IV, this portion of the naval spectrum has not been used in
Southeast Asia by the United States since 194ft Ett# exam-
ples oi Kcrea and Lebanon testified to American willingness
to use this part of the spectrum if circumstances required.
However, Korea had shown that any major polic* action car-
ried out adjacent to Communist China would probably result




not be treated leasibiy as a minor power* Hence, the
military demonstration (and certain aspects 01 operational
assistance) seemed to form the "brink oi war" which the
United States approached cm several occasions subsequent
to the Korean War*
: i j itarv Demonstrations
In spite el the apparent failure oi Che demonstra-
n by \merican naval forces off Indo-China li il 1954,
military demonstrations have been tie most important type of
ration conducted by the United States Navy in Southeast
n
ia since 195c* These demonstrations were conducted in
direct support of the containment barrier, and brought the
-ted States very close to opes military conflict wl
15Communist Chine*
attero is discernible in the events provoking
these demonstrations. On each occasion the united States
was challenged t\ vougfa an ally or other power with which t
United states had a community of security interests* This
third power was subjected to heavy military pressure* The
—Tr-i " t m i mth i - n-—
-
ii murmi i i i i mi m in i - i mini i n inm—m - i nniiiii i n i «*nmi.u - - -n i - Hiiwu riinitiii i... t-twi.uw-um.l~ —
14The reader is reminded that in assessing ..re
or success oi' an operation, the criteria stipulated supra,
•
. M, are be in*- used.
The United States has conducted i ive naval demon-
strations in Southeast \sia since 1945: (1) Indc-CT ina,
April, It 3s; (2) Indo-China, June-July, 14 j (3) Tad en
evacuation, February, 15 35; (4) QttOToy, September, 1958;
(3) Laos crisis, September, 195*. The Laos demonstration
was not as well defined as the others and is not discussed
in this study. Though not listed, the laiwan Straits patrol
could be considered a continuing demonstration.

l(
Lnlced States was placed in the position oi either coming, to
tie rescue, usually under disadvantageous political condi-
tions, or oi suiierin^ another loss in prestige and material
stren.ti . il is pattern comprises part of what Kissinger
calls "the ^ino-Soviet strategy of ambiguity." The dilem-
mas posed by the bine-Soviet challenge, usually in the guise
of indigenous movements, gave rise to many stresses and
strains within the structure ox \llied unity.
A pattern is discernible also in the American demon-
strations undertaken in reaction to each of these provoca-
tions* bach American answer to the challenge was carried
primarily by naval forces* £ach time the American response
became stronger and more resolute, though there was no lack
opposition both at home and abroad condemning that re-
sponse* The more resolutely the demonstration has been
executed, the more successful it seems to have been* How-
ever, these demonstrations lave been toe few in number to
draw any firm conclusions in this respect.
Tie demonstration off the coast of Indo-China in
54 (at the time oi the siege oi bienbienphu) was
conducted in a tentative manner. Except tor the iact that
intervention was seriously considered this operation was
closer to ambiguous maneuver to assist an ally than a demon-
stration to warn an aggressor* The demonstration was car-




any threat Implied simply was not credible to the Viet Minh
or the Chinese Communists. In the end political considera-
tions precluded American intervention,
subsequent demonstration too*, place in June and
July ot 1954, during the Geneva Conference. There las been
some speculation that this demonstration may have been in-
strumental in permitting the West to salvage South Viet Nam,
and indeed the rest or Southeast \sia, alter the trench de-
18bade in Indo-China. One reporter, basing his conclusions
on a number of interviews with secretary oi State Dulles
stated:
But again the policy oi boldness impressed the Com-
munists. Dulles tad seen to it that the Chinese and
the Soviets knew that the U.S. was prepared to act
decisively to prevent the iall of all of Southeast
Asia. • . Thus instead of negotiating irom the I
treme and undisguised weakness of the Irene? position,
Mendes-trance and Eden [at Geneva] found themselves
able to bargain Dulles* strength. 1$
wever, the fact remains that North Viet &am was
lost to the Communists. There was, and is, scant consola-
tion in the fact that more was not lost. The application
the demonstration technique did not improve the situa-
tion, but it possibly prevented a lurther deterioration.
The demonstration coincident with the evacuation of
See g^ra
. pp. 2^-25, 77.
18
oral Bell [tor tie Royal Institute of Interna-
tional Ail airs j, purvey oi International Allaire. 1954




the Tachen Islands was carried out with more resolution.
American xorces were placed close enough to Communist posi-
tions and in such strength that their intention was unmis-
takable* Among those porticipeting in the evacuation and
demonstration ti ere was little doubt that Communist opposi-
tion would have meant war. Although the Chinese Communists
had little to gain by opposing the evacuation, the simple
race a I matter was that in spite oi its threats "Commu-
nist China, in eiiect, temporarily submitted to U.S. naval
in the Pacixic during the evacuation. • .
The most convincing example oi the utility oi the
military demonstration occurred during tie • ueraoy crisis oi
1V58.
i uemoy. an adversary with an army ox 2,:, , md
over 1.8C0 jet lighters was induced to bae irom a
dan er.us miscalculation without the Navy's having to
re a Shot
4
be sure, the &avy did not bring oi
ti ese results alone. The weight oi the Air torce was
ali ..sjicucusly on the scales, and the Army's iu. ,
M in a much lesser amount. Yet the directing re
was the Navy's. Cuite properly the Kavy now looks upon
e Lebanon and .uemoy crises as textbook examples
sea power's unique capacity tor controlling
tt'di 1 incidents. 22
20
T3 is si ould not be construed as criticism of t
tactical commandera executing the demonstrations in the
waters adjacent to Indo-China. The indecision with 11
e demonstrations were carried out merely seemed to reflect
indecision and lac- oi agreement amc; leaders c
the West, Roberta, 31-34.
2"
* kichard P. Hart in, "Mighty L. , Fleet resides
Over Another thtll cut," t.fc« hews and world Keport, Febru-
ary 18, 1955, p. 4 .
*

All or the demonstrations conducted by the United
States In Southeast Asia since 1945 have been undertaken as
a result cf a challenge by the Coasaunist Bloc to tie con-
tainment barrier erected by the United States. When evalu-
ated by the criterion set at the beginning of this
23
section, this technique has produced the following re-
sults: (1) lailure in Indo-Cr ina in \prii 1954; (2) tacti-
cal success in Indo-Cr ina in June and July, 1954 and in the
Taci ens, February 19 55; (3) complete success at Quemoy in
September 1958.
The initial failure in Indo-CMna was due to the
unfavorable political environment combined with the remote
location oi besieged Dienbienpl-u* The subsequent demon-
stration at the time oi the Geneva Conference was a tactical
success in that it strengthened, to some decree, the hand o>.
stern di^ loraats conducting the negotiations at Geneva* In
a larger sense, however, more land and people were lost to
Communism* Ihe retreat was stopped; but the battle had al-
ready been lost* A similar occurrence was the Tachen evacu-
ation* Communist China stood to gain little by opposing an
evacuation that it was striving to bring about* The
Sutjra, p. V6*
J I
The remote location of Dienbienphu was a factor
only because of the umavorable political environment,
the political environment had been more favorable, as tor
example, at the outset oi: the Korean War, the rencte leca*
tion would have been a tactical inconvenience, but not a
bar to assistance for the defenders*
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operation was a tactical success In that the narrow tasks
given tie Navy were eUiciently completed without entering
into hostilities with t rammist torces.
While the second Indo-Chinese and lachen demonstra-
tions were not entirely valid tests ot the utility oi the
demonstration, at >"uemcy in ii-So there was a perfect meshing
oi objective, capability and commitment* Communist China
was iorced to recoil beiore xmerican naval power.
Again the United States proved to the world and espe-
cially to the peoples of Asia that it stood by its word,
that espoused principles were not just idle words. ...
.re is a very clear lesson tor t\ e people oi the
Inited States in all this, wi ere sea power was used by
the United States, where we could and did use it . our
influence was ielt. We quieted tie situation; and we
turned back the forces oi aggression. 25
In a larger sense these demonstrations in the vicin-
ity oi iaiwan have all been part oi a continuous (since
June 27, 1950) naval demonstration by the United States.
I resident iruman*s employment oi the ileet demonstrated a
keen understanding •£ the military "tacts oi liie H in bast
Asia. He, and subsequently V resident Eisenhower, indicated
to the Chinese Communists what tyrants oi. the past had
learned by bitter experience: when the seas and the air
over them are held by free men, manning strong naval forces,
Address by Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chie -<aval
erations, before the New Orleans Council cf the Kayy
League and members oi the Council oi the Chamber of Commerce
e greater New Orleans area, New Orleans, Louisiana,
:tober 2t. 1959. Emphasis added. Notice how Admiral but




military invasion across the seas Is impossible. This
failure to understand the sea, as they understood the land
(and later the air), has in the past proved the tyrants*
undoing* While this cause and etiect may not be perceived
by helping, the Chinese Communists cannot help tut dwell
on their impotence and frustration in the face o£ American
naval power* In other times and in otter places Communist
land power has been an overpowering threat to free peoples.
In Korea Chinese Communist armies held United Naticm. :es
to a stalemate. In the Taiwan Strait the United States Navy
has screed Pair o accept a corresponding disagreeable
status qt .
Some observers have asserted that one can gauge the
eilectiveness ef measures limiting Communist expansion I




those measures. By this standard the mission of the Sev-
enth Fleet, in si owl a determination of the United
States to contain Communist expansionism, has been success-
iully executed.
In view ox the ambiguous American commitment vis-a-
26
Ills is tie heritage ox Salamis, Lepanto, the
•nxs? \rmada, and the irustration oi Kapoleon and Hitler
in their efforts to invade Great Britain.
27For a selection oi Chinese Communist documents
denouncing the U.S. Davy's demonstrations off the coasts
Lna, see: Tl >nese teople*© Inst it
i
n
Affairs, -,ae U.S. Occupation .i Taiwan and ''Two Chinas "
in : Foreic^n Lan.-aiaies rress, 1958), pp. 5, 15,
177*23-2^, Si, 38, 72.
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vis the offshore islands, the use of navel forces las
tared the United States the best swans ot defending Ameri-
can interests in the Taiwan Strait. As indicated in Chapter
III, the naval demcnstration is admirably suited to situa-
tions where such amiir^jity is a useiul technique ot foreign
policy. Mcvements ot naval forces caa
readily be changed from a peaceful to a hostile charac-
ter—by diverse announcements--and back again, ...
air movements can be stopped on si ort notice and their
meanings can be quickly reinterpreted. • • .29
The commitment of land lorces to the defense of uemoy and
Hatsu would have been politically unfeasible and to some
extent irrevocable. Land-based air lorces while more ilex-
ible would I ave suffered other handicaps. "^
There has been some criticism of military demonstra-
tions in general as being obsolete in the nuclear «§•« Al-
fred Vagts, implying that demonstrations as conducted by the
West are bluffs, maintains that the threat inherent in the
military demonstration is not credible to t aaaunist




"'Tie principal disadvantage cf using air elements
in such a situation is the lack of "stay! wer" cf air-
craft. This limitation is aggravated during conditions of
r flying weather, further, aircraft are inherently less
capable ox observing the precipe nicetie^
twelve mile limit. finally, aircrs. . their
speed and smaller size, are less visible—even on radar
scopes. In many circumstances a visible deterrent is that
Lch is most required.
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war moves and gestures, because they are persuaded cl at
their adversaries are not going to war even if they demon-
strate."31 Writing beiore the guemoy crisis of 1S58, Vagts
probably justified this opinion on the basis of the American
reaction to the Berlin Blockade and the French defeat in
Indc-Cl.ina. Nevertheless, even beiore 1958, the entire
history oi the cold war s) owed that wherever the Soviet
colonial empire was met with resolution and adequate force,
its designs were thwarted. The events oi the past fifteen
years have si own that Va&ts 9 view has validity only when
Lied to an oiiensive demonstration--one calculated to
threaten rather than deter. kith the possible exception
the demonstration conducted in conjunction with the blen-
bienpiu crisis in 1954 this type of demonstration as not
been conducted by the United States since 1
Henry Kissinger is more impressed with the contempo-
rary value oi the demonstration.
I tinted States, • • • requires a twentieth -century
equivalent of "showing the flag, 1 ' an ability and a
readiness to make our power i'elt quickly and decisively,
not only to deter Soviet aggression but also tc impress
the uncommitted with our capacity ior decisive action. 32
He was particularly impressed with the limited war capabil-
ity of the Navy's task forces, which he considered to have
diversity of capabilities so necessary in meeting SUNH
33Soviet challenges.
3I





The effectiveness wi salutary presence as applied ty
the United States in Southeast Asia has been limited, The
presence oi American naval forts* i as been considered
some nations in Scutrem Asia as a threat to their newly-won
independence. is is a misconception that the Communists
have tai en reat pains to cultivate.
be eiiective this portion oi the \ ower spectrum
requires that there be a mutually acknowledged community
security interests between the naval power utilizing salu-
tary presence and the powers on whose behali it is employed.
Such a coiamunity oi security interests normally requires
that ti e nations involved lave a similar image oi the mena
the potential aggressor . I his common ima&e of the poten-
tial aggressor has been la outheast Asia since I
end o- rid war II. "1 astern I owers are ... in the
invidious position of Wi to defend countries, which do
not wis! to be deiended, from dangers the existence oi whl
34
"/ernx&ents deny in ic."
: menace oi the Communist empire does not seem
real to many ait! east \sia because
(1) their relative geographic Isolation e centers
Communist power, (2) the la iitical sophistication
among tie region, (3) the usually s. I ui




35diplomacy. On the other \ and, the presence ox
Western naval power has aroused criticism, at least partly
because oi its uniortunate history as an instrument I o-
nial exploitation. Lven in the post-war era Western naval
power was deployed in attempts to put down independence
movements. \nd, as Admiral Burke points out, "Memories
are long in the Far Eas; i
Except tor a few lapses the American response
• Slno-Soviet threat under these conditions fas been to
use salutary presence very sparingly and judiciously.
Visits by American nava. ^es to ports in Southeast Asia
have been very limited except in tire ines and i Taiwan
36
where special conditions exist.
The modest maneuvers conducted by the Powers
\ ave combined two elements distasteiul to tie uncommitted
states c. dern Asia: (1) the presence oi Western naval
forces in the area, (2) collective security arrangements
t of the cold war. These maneuvers, fre-
quent 9 have seldom been on a large scale. Here, it las
been necessary to compromise between regard fee neutralist
35Recently (IS 58-60;, there have been some lapses in
the i oi the Sino-Soviet diplomacy. t\ d Chinese -
gression in Tibet and India has aroused some alarm in Sout -
east Asia, relations between fted na and Indonesia became
acrimonious in 195V as a result or internal policies oi I
Indonesian government, vis-a-vis the resident Chinese im-
munity.
He United States has mutual security treaties
with tie I nes and Taiwan . . the r
to base military .orces on their "respective territories.

Ill
leellngs on the one land and military e; iectlveness on the
MN "A delicate balance has to be sought between too
-, Ltruslve a Western presence and a situation in which no
37
real defense for the area exists." The maneuvers seem
to have been an e£iort tc breathe life into rather
than a serious attempt to penect its military co-ordina-
tion. 38
To say that the salutary presence portion of the
power spectrum should be used sparingly and judiciously in
Southeast Asia is not to say that American naval power
should be withdrawn to satis reign critics.
We should, course, seek to allay legitimate
. ievances, but we would La wrong to take every criti-
cism at iiace value. • • • Many 6i our most voluble
critics in Southeast Asia would be terrified were our
military protection suddenly withdrawn. The neutrality
of the uncommitted is possible, utter all, only so long
as the United States remains strong spiritually and
physically. 3^
writing tor an Vmerlcan audience Mohammed Fatta,
Vice I resident ci Indonesia, acknowledged that nation*
s
contemporary relationship to the naval power oi the West.
Indonesia, it may be said, is bounded by the Brltish
Kavy and the American Navy, whic! control the Indian
37'" Collective Defence in Southeast \sia . 166.
UAlthough a convincing argument can be made tor the
need oi such co-ordination, t jtcss i TO nations
have not been integrated to a decree even approac
ose o CO. . . Hilar, Jr., --Segaen





and iaciiic ocean*. But no one can say that Britain
and ti-e United States have evil designs on Indonesia.
the contrary , they are desirous of seeing Indonesia
remain independent and prosperous. -•
Other Southeast \sia leaders are less candid—particularly
when addressing domestic audiences.
In evaluating salutary presence it cannot be said to
have tailed in Southeast \sia» Under tie existing circum-
stances it merely has not been the most useiul tool ior the
task to be done. Given the existing political environment
in Southeast Asia the Army and ilr rorce would have labored
under even greater handicaps in trying to inaplament this
portion or the spectrum.***
are are indications that a greater awareness oi
the Communist menace is growing among tie governments , ii
not the peoples, on the area.** • traumatic experience
India (a nation to wt let some ol the nations in Southeast
Asia look ior political Leadership) on tux northern iron-
tiers has been an example that has not gene unnoticed among
Southeast \sian states* With further changes in milt*
leal climate salutary presence, quite possibly, will be more
useiul in xuture years in Southeast Asia, as the identity
^%tobmmmd Hatta, "Indonesia's foreign Iclicy,"
t prolan uiairs . ril t 1V53), 445.
41See supra * « 6^-65.
^^Tiin Ho, "foreign illations, - . aaauni s.t CI- ina 1 *? 5 7




the security Interests between the ^est end ire* Asia Is
more clearly revealed to the latter*
> olitico-humanitarian Assistance
Since world War II this portion of the spectrum has
been applied by the United States in the Far East with con-
spicuous success* The Navy has been only one of the agen-
cies oi. the U*S* Government employing this technique, but
its contribution has been both significant and unique* To
i.ind a case in which such assistance did not loster good
relations (or at least improved relations), between the
United States and the recipient nation, would be difficult.
As has been indicated on several occasions in this
study, t assage to freedom" in Viet Nam was one of the
outstanding propaganda successes e • cold war* In ti is
operation tie Navy exchanged its mailed fist for the velvet
glove* From a powerful instrument that might have inter-
vened at jjienbienphu, it was transformed into an instrument
of humanity* Mere, western power was not used to shore
a tottering colonial regime, but was used to give Asians the
means wit* which to exercise their right oi self-determina-
tion as guaranteed in the U«X« Charter* Rather than gainirv
a transitory military victory over Communism and alleitatin.
many of its irlends by military intervention, the United
States in a dramatic humanitarian gesture, made possible
by its great and i
. legible naval power, unmasked the face
Communism for all of Southeast Asia to see*

The evacuation of the civil population from the
1 act ens, altbougt similar in purpose, was too beclouded by
military considerations and the international unpopularity
ei the laiwan regime to provide the dramatic impact oi t>
e
"Passage to Freedom. Never t) el ess, principles were main-
tained; the United States was determined that no person
would iall under the Communist yoke as a result oi the
United States tailing to provide the means whereby a tree
ci oice could be made.
atanitarian assistance I er peoples has long
been an attribute ei the American national character. The
idea that such assistance should be a political weapon is
repugnant to most Americans. Happily for the United States
in a world of realpoliti<i , humanitarian assistance is a
means with it can satisfy its altruistic propensities
and gain its foreign policy objectives.
• tangible results oi politico-lumanitarian
assistance are usually difficult to ascertain. They would
appear to bear little relationship to a policy oi contain-
ment. Such assistance, towever, is one of the means wit
which the United States can make containment leasible.
Ey demonstrating our community of interests in the area
o£ human relations to nations suet as those in Southeast
La, it may be possible to demonstrate our identity of




Humanitarian assistance, promptly and efticissntly
rendered, with no strings attached, i as ottered the United
States one oi its best opportunities tc break down the sus-
picion towards Western naval power held by the states of
Southeast Asia* When this assistance can be rendered by
warships of the United States, some of the prejudice against
the presence oi American naval power can be dispelled*
American warship may in fvt\ire years be the symbol oi:
friendship and a community ox security interests rather
m an object of distrust and suspicion.
e Navy's Contribution
Indicated in Chapter II the over-riding security
ective of the United States in Southeast sia, as else-
where, since World War II has been the construction and
maintenance oi a containment barrier to resist Communist
encroacuaent. This objective implies the existence oi a
companion-objective: the strengthening oi the iree nations
utbeast sia so that they may better preserve their
independence and thus take their places on the bulwarks of
freedom* Military protection has been essential to the na-
tions oi Southeast .sia during the unstable years following
independence* Witt out it there would have been no time tc
make even a start at the tasks oi building stable democratic
43institutions and viable economies* This military protection
^mmm m—mmmm**mmm**m**mm****mHmmimmm*^m**—ma —t*——-w- m i n i !! i u*~*mmmmmmmmmimmmmmmmm—*m»*m*m»*»><mi\i * i\mmmmmm— **wwww——
»
43 lective i>eience in Southeast -.sia . 166.
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has been rendered by the armed lorces oi tie West--Che Navy
ol the United states in particular.
Edgar lurniss has said: "foreign policies, includ-
ing military ones, must be content with partial coverage,
partial results, temporary successes. is observation
applies to the results acl ieved by the employment ot the
spectrum 01 modern naval capabilities by the United States
in Southeast Asia since 1945. lart of Indo-Cbina was lost
to the tree world because ox a xailure to gauge iriy the
political tempo oi the post-World War 11 era in Southeast
Asia* The Navy could not retrieve this mistake* Subse-
quently, the Navy was utilized under more auspicious polit-
ical circumstances and Communist aggression in Southeast
Asia was iirst slowed down, and then brought to a halt at
s*moy in 1958. This is not to say that the Kavy was the
only instrument used tc deiend southeast Asia; military and
economic aid programs played an important role* The 8avy,
however, was the essential component in tie power combina-
tion used by American statesmen*
The most vital naval contribution in east Asia
has been the military demonstration. The indication oi f
American willingness to use iorce to thwart Communist expan-
sionism has been the key iactor in implementing the contain-
ment concept in Bast sia. The example ot Korea indicated




the iree world perimeter end lent realism to the message
• demonstrations conveyed, the example of tie stead-
st American stand at ueraoy in 195b was duly noted, and
quietly applauded even among some oi tie staunchest iree
\sian critics of U.S. policy.
As a result oi the masterly handling ol the Cuemoy
crisis in aaLer lv53, L. . j restige las risen
throughout Southeast Asia, lie tact that the United
ttes could and woula act immediately and decisively
with its military striking power in deiense 01 an Asian
ally had a most impressive effect on the Treaty area
countries and served as a somber warning to the Con*
munis ts. ^
5
Salutary presence i as not been as useiul a tool in
lift \sla as it has been in the Mediterranean. Tie
Sixtl Fleet las operated in an area where ti ere are ruany
treaty allies oi tie United states, while its presence has
been tie cause oi some resentment by the United Aral) ub-
lic and considerable vituperation ty the Soviet Union, it
has been welcomed by those states on tie nortlern shores
of the Mediterranean are nearer the Soviet threat.
In Southeast \sia there remains a need lot a ;reater aware-
ness of tie nature ot the Sino-Soviet menace beiore salutary
presence will be a more useiul tool for American statesmen
to employ.
Lit ice -humanitarian assistance oilers the United
States the greatest opportunity to expose Communist inten-




The United States should maintain and iurtber develop Its
readiness to render this type oi aid. The interest m
greeted tie new "Great White Fleet" proposals and "Project
Hope" are an indication that these concepts have a >reat
popular appeal in the United States.
The combination of national (including naval) ca
bilities required to achieve American foreign policy objec-
tives in the years ahead is certain to change with political
developments and advances in technology. The task oli the
statesman will continue to involve the employtuenc ox the
various instruments of national policy in correct |
tions in order to realize national aspirations.
ideal instrument icr the statesman in the cold
war era is that which precisely conveys his intentions and
capabilities to his foreign counterparts. Such an instru-
ment must be flexible unless there is to be an economically
unacceptable number of instruments, each highly specialized
for only one or two tasks. In the military field such a
ilexible instrument is the modern navy, whose response,
indeed, "can vary from a cautioning gesture to an atomic
bomb.''47
The versatility and virtuosity of the U.S. Navy has
been amply demonstrated by the events in Southeast Asia
46Lile




since 1945. In the years to come the continued survival of
the tree world may well depend on the skill with which this
instrument is employed strategically by statesmen and tac-
tically by naval oiilcers on tie scattered battleiields
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